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LEGAL MALPRACTICE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF A BURGEONING CRISIS
by
JOSEPH H. KOFFLER*
Speaking for the Supreme Court of California, Justice Tobriner states:
An immunity from the statute of limitations for practitioners at the bar
not enjoyed by other professions is itself suspicious, but when conferred
by former practitioners who now sit upon the bench, it is doubly
suspicious. ' (emphasis added)
The legal profession confronts a challenge to develop rules of law that are
fair and complete in providing its clients with their day in court. To do less is to
default in its trust.
The rise in legal malpractice litigation has not to this point engulfed the
legal profession and threatened grave societal consequences, as is the case with
the medical profession and medical malpractice litigation. But there has been a
sharp and threatening rise in legal malpractice claims and litigation, so as to
pose serious problems for the profession and the communities it serves, and
these threaten to become markedly more serious.2 Whether the rise is due to
less care in professional practice or a growing awareness in the community of
the profits in litigation, it behooves the legal profession to generate a sense of
urgency to put its house in order. This, of course, involves maximizing the care
*Professor of Law, New York Law School; B.S.S., City College of New York; L.L.B., Harvard Law School.
The author acknowledges the excellent work of Sean Dwyer and Samuel Lee, students at New York Law
School, who assisted in the research for this article. The author also acknowledges the fine and willing
cooperation of the members of the library staff and the faculty secretaries at New York Law School in pro-
viding assistance in the preparation of this article.
'Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421 (1971).
2Mossner, Legal Malpractice Insurance Trends - The National and Michigan Experience, 65 MICH. B.J.
550, 550-551 (1986). While this article focuses upon the insurance aspect of legal malpractice claims, it also
indicates the rapidly escalating rate of these claims:
Thirty years ago lawsuits against lawyers were rare - so rare, in fact, that only about 10 percent of
all practicing attorneys bothered to purchase malpractice insurance.
During the 1960's there was a gradual increase in the number of claims brought against lawyers but
still, compared to today, the figures were modest. By the end of 1969 only 25 of every 1,000 attorneys
were subjected to a claim, and the average cost per claim was only about $5,300.
The real explosion in legal malpractice claims came in the late 1970's. By then one of every 14
lawyers in the country was reporting a claim to his/her carrier.
Iln] Itihe early 1980's ... legal malpractice claims against lawyers were still escalating at a rapid
rate ...
See also ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Profile of Legal Malpractice: A
Statistical Study of Determinative Characteristics of Claims Asserted Against Attorneys (1986), which con-
tains an analysis of 29,227 claims asserted against attorneys reported in the National Legal Malpractice
Data Center of the American Bar Association from January, 1983, through September 30, 1985; Mallen,
Legal Malpractice.- Controlling the Odds, TRIAL 24 (September 1984), reports on earlier statistics from the
American Bar Association's National Legal Malpractice Data Center.
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and safeguards used for the protection of clients, but it also has an additional
dimension. It involves establishing rational and just rules for litigating legal
malpractice claims.
Surprisingly little has been written on the law of legal malpractice. Even
more disturbing is the fact that there is little analytical writing to help guide
the courts and bar in this area. The analysis and recommendations contained
in this article are intended as a basis in developing rules for statutes of lim-
itations in legal malpractice actions that meet the needs of the parties, the test
of fundamental fairness, and evoke a genuine sense of confidence in society.
I. THE LATITUDE PROVIDED BY THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM
A. Historical Perspective.
The willingness of the sovereign, or his consent unwillingly exacted, to
repose in courts the ability to develop and modify rules of law by judicial deci-
sion provides a flexibility which distinguishes the common law system of
justice from others. As common law actions developed, procedural devices
were developed for the enforcement and limitation of the rights created.' The
actions became self-limiting, or confining, by the rigidity of the requirements
for each of the forms of action.' A degree of flexibility was provided by the
enactment of the Statute of Westminster II in 1285.1 This resulted in the ex-
pansion of the action of trespass on the case so that it could be used as a
residual remedy to overcome the inflexibility and constrictive nature of the
developed common law actions.'
With development of procedural devices such as the general and special
demurrer, the litigant was faced with the danger that an error in pleading
would result in the loss of substantive rights.7 Here, some relief was granted by
allowing amendments to pleadings! Throughout this development of substan-
tive and procedural law there runs the thread of the granting of a right, its for-
malization, its restriction, and then an effort to overcome restrictions by pro-
viding new rights and procedures. In this context, statutes of limitations
developed. As early as 1236, statutes were enacted in England that prohibited
3j. KOFFLER. COMMON LAW PLEADING. 32-43 (1969).
41d.
'The statute, 13 Edw. 1, c. 24, 1 Pickering's Statutes at Large, 196, provided:
And whensoever from henceforth it shall fortune in the Chancery, that in one Case a Writ is found,
and in like Case [in consimili casul, falling under like Law, and requiring like Remedy, is found none,
the Clerks of the Chancery shall agree in making the Writ; or the Plaintiffs may adjourn it until the
next Parliament, and let the cases written in which they cannot agree, and let them refer themselves
until the next Parliament, by Consent of Men learned in the Law, a Writ shall be made, lest it might
happen after that the Court should long time fail to minister Justice unto complainants. (Translation
of Cambridge Edition, 1762).
6J. KOFFLER. supra note 3, at 44-45, 175.
'Id. at 405.
11d. at 405, 558-564.
[Vol. 20:2
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real property actions if based on seisin prior to a given date.9 By 1540 an
English statute had enacted fixed time limitation periods. 0 The modern
legislative prescriptions are said to have their origin in the English Limitations
Act of 1623."
Statutes of limitations may generally be considered to be among the most
severely restrictive procedural devices, as they can truncate substantive rights.
However, the statutes also perform very positive functions. They allow in-
dividuals to function without unending concern or fear that actions will be in-
stituted against them. This lends fairness to the system of justice, as time dims
memories, records may be lost, and testimony and evidence may become
unavailable.' 2 Even beyond this, statutes of limitations provide an end to a
threat that may in various ways prevent individuals from functioning as pro-
ductively and efficiently as they might otherwise function, since the statutes
remove potential liability, as well as psychological stress. They thus provide
benefits for individuals and entities and allow for a more productive society.
B. Development of Statutes of Limitations in Legal Malpractice
Are statutes of limitations creatures of the legislative process, and not the
judicial? In answering this question, one must note that legislative enactments
prescribe periods of limitation for various actions. To this extent statutes of
limitations are creatures of the legislature. But the wisdom of this conclusion
terminates at this point. Legislative enactments may be specific in providing
the limitation period in terms of years, for various actions, but at this juncture
many questions may arise. This is particularly true in legal malpractice actions.
9See Note, Developments-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177 (1950).
"
0See 32 Hen. 8, c.2 (1540). This statute provided in part:
Be it therefore enacted by the King our Sovereign Lord, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That no manner
of Person or Persons shall from henceforth sue, have or maintain any Writ of Right, or make any
Prescription, Title or Claim of, to or for any Manors, Lands, Tenements, Rents, Annuities, Com-
mons, Pensions, Portions, Corrodies or other Hereditaments, of the Possession of his or their
Ancestor or Predecessor, and declare and allege any further Seisin or Possession of his or their
Ancestor or Predecessor, but only of the Seisin or Possession of his Ancestor or Predecessor, which
hath been, or now is, or shall be seized of the Said Manors, Lands, Tenements, Rents, Annuities,
Commons, Pensions, Portions, Corrodies or other Hereditaments, within threescore Years next
before the Teste of the same Writ, or next before the said Perscription, Title or Claim so hereafter to
be sued, commenced, brought, made or had.
"See Note, supra note 9 at 1177-78.
This statute, 21 Jac. 1, c.16. (1623), provided in part:
For quieting of Mens Estates, and avoiding of Suits, be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majes-
ty, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, That all
Writs of Formedon in Descender, Formedon in Remainder, and Formedon in Reverter, at any Time
hereafter to be sued or brought, of or for any Manors, Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, where-
unto any Person or Persons now hath or have any Title, or Cause to have or pursue any such Writ,
shall be sued and taken within Twenty Years next after the End of this present Session of Parliament;
And after the said Twenty Years expired, no such Person or Persons, or any of their Heirs, shall have
or maintain any such Writ, of or for any of the said Manors, Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments;...
2See Order of the R.R. Telegraphs v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
Fall, 19861
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Some of the questions that may be raised in legal malpractice actions are:
First: If there is no specific period of limitation fixed for legal malpractice,
in what category of action is it to be placed?
Second: In making this determination, should analogy be drawn to other
malpractice actions, such as medical malpractice, for which a specific
limitation period has been provided by statute?
Third: In making this determination, should analogy be drawn to some
other category, as, for example, negligence, for which a specific limitation
period is also provided by statute?
Fourth: If the period is established by analogy to that fixed for some other
category, how do we determine what this category is? For example, is it
negligence or contract, for which the periods of limitation differ? The an-
swer to this question may be critical to the success or failure of an action.
Fifth: Are the common law forms of action, although abolished by the
legislature, to be critical in determining questions relating to statutes of
limitations, and thus determine in certain cases whether the client will
succeed or fail in an action? In this regard, is present vitality given to the
observation of Maitland that, "The forms of action we have buried, but
they still rule us from their graves"?'
Sixth: Do courts make determinations concerning statutes of limitations
in legal malpractice actions that appear to be in direct conflict with
legislative enactments?
Seventh: Do courts "favor" attorneys in certain instances by accepting or
rejecting the analogy with medical malpractice, where the statute of
limitations is at issue in a legal malpractice action?
In addition to considering problems that arise in dealing with questions
such as these, this article proceeds into an area of decisional law that is fre-
quently divorced from legislative enactment. This involves a consideration of
decisional principles in various jurisdictions, grounded in differing perceptions
of public policy, as to when the statute of limitations begins to run in legal
malpractice actions.' This includes a consideration of continuous representa-
tion doctrines and discovery rules, 5 as they have been formulated and applied
in legal malpractice actions. These doctrines and rules may or may not find
their basis in legislative enactment.
Questions which should be considered are: What competing considera-
tions should be taken into account and how should they be treated in develop-
ing rules for time limitations in legal malpractice actions? What is good that
"The Forms of Action at Common Law, Lecture 1, 2 (Cambridge, 1948).
"See discussion in Section III through VII and IX through X.
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has developed in jurisdiction X and what is good that has developed in jurisdic-
tion Y? Conversely, what is unfair, inadequate, or incomplete in the resolu-
tions found in the various jurisdictions? Finally, what is an ideal solution? This
article is intended to provide a basis for answering many of these questions.
Proposals that may be used in approaching an ideal solution are suggested at
the conclusion of this article.
II. SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM THE PRESENT USE
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE
ACTIONS
As the law of each state governs the rules and principles applied in legal
malpractice litigation, it is not surprising to find basic differences among the
various jurisdictions. This is the price inevitably exacted by the common law,
and it is often a good one, as diversity in cultural, economic and industrial
climates in various jurisdictions are frequently best served by the development
of different rules and principles of law. Both decisional law and legislative
enactment may generate these differences. Such is the case in legal malprac-
tice. However, it is difficult to conclude that these differences in the cultural,
economic and industrial climate in various jurisdictions justify differences in
the rules relating to statutes of limitations in legal malpractice actions.
The following results can occur in some or most jurisdictions as the body
of law presently exists:
1. A client's rights can be extinguished before the client can maintain an
action for violation of these rights.
2. A client may be limited to the recovery of nominal damages, although
substantial actual damage thereafter results from the attorney's
negligence.
3. A client's rights can be extinguished before the client is aware of facts
on the basis of which the client can maintain an action to vindicate
these rights.
4. A client's rights can be extinguished before the client is removed from
an environment of dependence upon the attorney.
5. A client's rights can be extinguished while the attorney fails to disclose
information which would permit the client to obtain relief for violation
of these rights.
All of these results are unacceptable. Further consideration of statutes of
limitations in legal malpractice actions illustrates the need for significant
modifications in legislative and judicial approaches in this area.
III. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE DAMAGE RULE AND THE OCCURRENCE RULE
Traditionally the statute of limitations begins to run in an action at law at
Fall, 1 9861
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the time a cause of action comes into existence or accrues." Applying this con-
cept to legal malpractice actions, this would generally mean that when the ac-
tion is in tort, grounded in negligence, the statute of limitations would begin to
run from the time that duty, breach of duty, causation and damage all come in-
to existence. 7 This is described as the damage rule, in that it requires that there
be actual damage before the statute of limitations begins to run." There is
authority for application of the damage rule in legal malpractice actions." Ap-
plication of this rule in legal malpractice is, however, not without its problems,
as indicated in the subsequent discussion in this article."
There is also authority in legal malpractice actions for the application of
the occurrence rule, which provides that the statute of limitations begins to
run from the time of the wrongful act or omission, even if actual damage has
not as yet occurred." This is most disturbing, because application of the occur-
rence rule will, in some circumstances, prevent the client from recovering in
tort for actual damages caused by an attorney's negligence.2 Similarly disturb-
ing is the fact that application of the occurrence rule can result in a client's ac-
tion in contract against an attorney being lost by the running of the statute of
limitations, because the action might have been, but wasn't, brought, although
under the circumstances only nominal damages could have been recovered. 3
Here the client forfeits his right to recover for actual damages, which may later
occur.
A caveat is observed with respect to the discussion of the occurrence rule
and the damage rule that follows in sections IV, V, VI and VII. In some juris-
dictions, a discovery rule may be superimposed upon these rules. Furthermore,
a continuous representation rule, or a similar rule differently named, may sup-
plement these rules in some jurisdictions. Discovery rules, continuous repre-
sentation rules, and similar rules differently named, are discussed in later sec-
tions of this article. 4 The discussion in those sections must therefore be consid-
ered in conjunction with the analysis presented in sections IV, V, VI and VII.
IV. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE OCCURRENCE RULE - THE DOCTRINE OF
WILCOX V PLUMMER
With the occurrence rule, the proposition is that the statute of limitations
l"Note, supra note 9, at 1200.
"Note, supra note 9, at 1201; PROSSER ON TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984).
"PROSSER ON TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984); Note, supra note 9, at 1200-1201.
"See, Sections VI and VII for discussion of Damage Rule.
201d.




4See Section IX for discussion of Discovery Rules, and Section X for discussion of Continuous Representa-
tion and Comparable Rules.
[Vol. 20:2
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begins to run in a legal malpractice action from the time of the wrongful act or
omission, even if actual damage has not as yet occurred." This principle was
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Wilcox v. Plummer,16 which
was an action in assumpsit, and shall presently be considered at length.
Where the legal malpractice action is brought in tort, there is also support
for this proposition that the statute of limitations begins to run from the time
of the wrongful act or omission, even if this is before actual damage is sus-
tained. 7 This proposition was accepted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in a
legal malpractice action which principally involved a question of statutory in-
terpretation. 8 The court observed that in formulating the statute of limitations
for actions based on professional negligence, Nebraska's legislature had ex-
pressly stated that such actions "shall be commenced within two years next
after the alleged act or omission."29 It concluded that in selecting this language
the legislature rejected actual damage as the index for the inception of the time
limit for an action based on malpractice, and that "tortious invasion of
another's legal right is the triggering device for the statute of limitations."30
This is, however, not in accord with the traditional requirements for tort ac-
tions grounded in negligence, which necessitate actual loss or damage for an
action to come into existence, with the result that generally the statute of
limitations does not begin to run in a negligence action until actual damage has
been sustained.'
Where a legal malpractice action was brought in assumpsit, the United
States Supreme Court, in 1830, in Wilcox v. Plummer,32 adopted the view that
the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the breach, even though
"See, e.g., McClain v. Johnson, 160 Ga. App. 548, 288 S.E.2d 9 (1981), affd 248 Ga. 877, 289 S.E.2d 247
(1982), a legal malpractice action in which the alleged unskillful act was the drafting of a property settlement
agreement. The court states:
It is not the special damage or injury resulting from the unskillfulness of an attorney at law in the
representation of his client's interests, but the breach of the duty imposed by the contract of employ-
ment, which gives a right of action for damages sustained. The statute of limitations [sic] in such a
case runs, therefore, from the date of the breach of duty, and not from the time when the extent of the
resulting injury is ascertained. Gould v. Palmer & Read, 96 Ga. 798, 22 S.E. 583 (1895); Riser v.
Livsey, 138 Ga. App. 615, 227 S.E.2d 88 (1976).
Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, 581 P.2d 851, 854 (Nev. 1978), where the court observes:
If the theory of recovery rests upon breach of a written contract, the six-year statute of limitations
provided in NRS 11.190(1)(b) would begin to run at the moment of breach, and the limitation period
has elapsed.
Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978), where the court states:
Whether we apply appellants' suggestion that I.C. § 5-224 should apply, or respondent's suggestion
that I.C. § 5-217 is applicable, under either statute the action is barred within four years of the date of
the occurrence.
2129 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
"Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W. 2d 186 (1984).
nId.
"id. at 505, 357 N.W. 2d at 190.
3"Id. at 505-06, 357 N.W.2d at 191.
"PROSSER ON TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984); Note, supra note 9, at 1201.
n29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
Fall, 19861
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no actual damage has as yet been sustained. As a basis for justifying this con-
clusion, the court indicated that nominal damages would, in such a case, be
awardable. 3 In Wilcox it was alleged and proven that an attorney, the testator
of the defendant, received a note from plaintiff for collection. The defendant
pled the statute of limitations. On one count, the court held that the statute
began to run at the time the attorney ought to have sued an endorser, and on
another count, at the time the attorney committed a misnomer of plaintiffs.
This was so, the court held, even though at these times the plaintiff had suf-
fered no actual damage.34
It has been said that viewed as a contract action, the Wilcox holding has
intrinsic merit because the attorney impliedly agreed to act diligently. He
breached this agreement, and a cause of action for breach of contract is
generally held to accrue at the time of breach.3 Even if this reasoning has
merit, it can result in a client being without any remedy for actual damage he
sustains as a result of the attorney's negligence. If, measuring from the time
the attorney's negligence occurred, the period of limitation expires before the
client suffers actual damage, the client is without a remedy for actual damage,
however serious, which he thereafter incurs as a result of the attorney's
negligence. Such a result is unconscionable. It seems clear that the United
States Supreme Court, in deciding Wilcox, consciously recognized that such a
result could flow from its decision. The court cited Battley v. Faulkner36 as "ex-
actly this case,"37 pointing out that the damage in Battley depended upon an
issue in another suit, and could not be assessed by the jury until the final result
in that suit was definitely known. Yet it was held that plaintiff should have in-
stituted his action and was barred for not doing so.
V. AVOIDING UNCONSCIONABLE RESULTS FLOWING FROM THE
WILCOX V. PLUMMER DOCTRINE
Unconscionable results that can flow from Wilcox, in whole or in part,
may be avoided, by formulating additional theories, or by novel applications of
existing theories.
First: Even where a court insists on adhering to the Wilcox doctrine, its
effect can be isolated by making it applicable to only a very small segment of
legal malpractice cases. This can be accomplished by applying concepts that
have been developed in legal malpractice actions, although in another context,
331d. at 182.
34Id.
3 Ellis, Malpractice Accural: Adherence to the Common Law in Professional Negligence Actions, 19 IDAHO
L. REV. 63, 69 (1983).
-3 B. & Aid. 288, 22 Rev. Reptr. 390 (1820).
1129 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172, 182 (1830).
[Vol. 20:2
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in cases in New York,38 Illinois,39 Alaska ' ° and the Virgin Islands.' These cases
involve a problem different from that under consideration. A crucial issue in
these cases is whether the tort or contract statute of limitations should be ap-
plied, with the client seeking application of the longer contract statute by alleg-
ing the action as one for breach of contract. Application of the shorter tort
statute of limitations would result, in these factual situations, in the actions be-
ing time-barred. In most instances, the court concludes that irrespective of the
form in which the action is pled, the tort statute of limitations applies. It does
this by narrowing the area, or type of factual situation, in which a wrong com-
mitted by an attorney can be considered a breach of contract, rather than a
tort.
The principles in these cases also provide a compelling basis for greatly
limiting the types of cases in which the Wilcox doctrine can be applied. In
Wilcox the court concludes that the occurrence rule applies in contract ac-
tions, and anchors its holding on the fact that the legal malpractice action in
Wilcox is in assumpsit. If, however, a legal malpractice action must, in a par-
ticular instance, irrespective of the nature of the pleadings, be treated as one in
tort for negligence, there is in such a case no sound basis for application of the
Wilcox doctrine, and the damage rule should be applied. Some jurisdictions
already apply the damage rule in legal malpractice actions in tort for
negligence,'2 and where they have not already done so, they should be persuad-
ed to follow the general rule in actions in tort for negligence, which provides
for application of the damage rule. 3 To make an exception for legal malprac-
tice actions, to the serious detriment of clients, cuts sharply against fundamen-
tal fairness, and should find no support in sound public policy.
Cases which have considered whether the tort or contract statute of
limitations should be applied have not spoken in identical terms, but there is a
clear thread, or similarity, in the principles enunciated. In DiPietro v. Hecker,44
the court states that "in the absence of an agreement to obtain a specific result,
carelessness resulting in professional miscarriage would be governed by the
"See DiPietro v. Hecker, 43 Misc. 2d 630, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 704(1964); Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Reynolds,
3 A.D.2d 686, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 95 (1957); Albany Sav. Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, 95
A.D.2d 918, 463 N.Y.S. 2d 896 (1983); Brainard v. Brown, 91 A.D.2d 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1983). Con-
tra:Sinopoli v. Cocozza, 105 A.D. 2d 743, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 177 (1984); Kramer v. Belfi, 106 A.D. 2d 615, 482
N.Y.S. 2d 898 (1984).
"See Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. III. 1981).
4°See Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981).
'4See Moorehead v. Miller, 102 F.R.D. 834 (V.I. 1984).
"See. e.g., where the damage rule is applied, frequently in conjunction with the discovery rule: Fort Meyers,
Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe and Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 946 (1968);
Byers v. Burleson, 713 F.2d 856 (D.C. 1983); Levin v. Berley, 728 F.2d 551 (Ist Cir. 1984); Jaramillo v.
Hood, 93 N.M. 433, 601 P.2d 66 (1979); Luick v. Rademacher, 129 Mich. App. 803, 342 N.W. 2d 617
(1983); Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 239 Kan. 83, 716 P.2d 575 (1986); Arizona Management Corp. v.
Kollof, 142 Ariz. 64, 688 P.2d 710 (1984).
41See generally PROSSER ON TORTS § 30; F. POLLOCK. LAW OF TORTS 244 (3rd Ed. 1894).
"251 N.Y.S. 2d 704, 43 Misc. 2d 630 (1964).
Fall, 19861
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three-year [negligence] statute, otherwise the six-year [contract] statute would
apply." 5 In Glens Falls Insurance Company v. Reynolds," the opinion states
that "[clarelessness resulting in professional miscarriage, in the absence of
agreement to obtain a specific result or to assure against miscarriage, "I would
usually be governed by the three year statute of limitations for negligence (em-
phasis added). The court adds: "But if there was an agreement to obtain a
specific result or to assure the effect of the legal services rendered, the six-year
Statute of Limitations in contract may apply."48
In Bonanno v. Potthoff, " an attorney entered into a retainer agreement to
represent a client in the prosecution or settlement of all claims against a partic-
ular party. The complaint alleged that the attorney, due to negligence, failed to
represent the client in certain litigation. The court states that this is not a situa-
tion in which the client's claim "asserts only a general failure to provide rea-
sonably competent professional services or some other broad noncontractual
claim."50 It rather charges the attorney "with failure to perform precisely what
he had contracted to do."5' On this basis, the court found that the ten-year con-
tract limitation period applied, which made the plaintiffs complaint timely.
In Van Horn Lodge v. White,52 the court observed that the duty allegedly
breached "was a duty of reasonable care imposed by law. . ."I The court add-
ed: "There is no evidence of an agreement to obtain a particular result. . ."I It
concluded that the essence of the complaint was in negligence, "the gravamen
thereof lies in tort,"" and therefore the applicable statute of limitations was
one for tort and not for contract. In Moorehead v. Miller, 6 the court indicated
"I1d. at 706, 43 Misc. 2d at 630-31. See also Albany Say. Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge,
95 A.D. 2d 918, 463 N.Y.S. 2d 896 (1983); Brainard v. Brown, 91 A.D. 2d 287, 458 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (1983).
Contra: Sinopoli v. Cocozza, 105 A.D. 2d 743,481 N.Y.S. 2d 177 (1984); Kramer v. Belfi, 106 A.D. 2d 615,
482 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (1984). For a discussion of the differing views in New York and their bases, see Section
VIII, infra, at the point where Video Corporation v. Frederick Flatto Associates, Inc., 58 N.Y.S. 2d 1026,
462 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (1983), is discussed.
'63 A.D. 2d 686, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 95 (1957).
"Id. at 686, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 97 (emphasis added). See, also, Albany Say. Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart,
Rhodes & Judge, 95 A.D.2d 918, 463 N.Y.S. 2d 896 (1983); Brainard v. Brown, 91 A.D.2d 287,458 N.Y.S.
2d 735 (1983). Contra: Sinopoli v. Cocozza, 105 A.D. 2d 743, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 177 (1984); Kramer v. Belfi, 106
A.D. 2d 615,482 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (1984). For a discussion of the differing views in New York and their bases,
see Section VIII, infra, at the point where Video Corporation of America v. Frederick Flatto Associates,
Inc., 58 N.Y. 2d 1026, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (1983), is discussed.
48Id.
'p527 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
"Id. at 566.
"Id.




"1102 F.R.D. 834 (V.I. 1984).
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that it was settled in the jurisdiction that legal malpractice was subject to the
two-year general tort statute of limitations. "To sound in contract, and thereby
be governed by the six-year statute of limitations, a legal malpractice suit must
be based on the nonperformance of a specific undertaking or promise con-
tained in the contract"" (emphasis added).
If the principles in these cases are applied where the question is whether
an action is to be treated as one in contract or tort for the purpose of determin-
ing whether the Wilcox doctrine requires application of the occurrence rule -
as it will if the action is treated as one in contract - it appears that the follow-
ing conclusions are viable: If an alleged contractual breach was caused by the
negligence of the attorney, the court will, generally, treat the action as one in
tort for negligence, irrespective of the posture of the pleadings. If the jurisdic-
tion applies the damage rule in legal malpractice actions in tort for negligence,
the complaint will be found timely if the period of limitation, measuring from
the time actual damage was sustained, has not expired. This will result pro-
vided (and dependent upon the particular jurisdictional view) that the action is
not based upon 1) a failure to live up to an agreement to obtain a specific or
particular result;59 2) a failure to perform precisely what the attorney con-
tracted to do;6° 3) a failure to perform a specific undertaking or promise con-
tained in the contract between attorney and client;61 or 4) a failure to live up to
an agreement which assured the effect of legal services.62
In this manner, in jurisdictions applying the Wilcox doctrine, legal
malpractice actions may be sustained against the defense of the statute of
limitations in a vast majority of cases, because fact patterns in legal malprac-
tice cases are generally grounded in negligence, and relatively few cases fall
within the provisos set forth above. Thus, the unconscionable result that may
flow from Wilcox - having the statute of limitations run before the client has
suffered actual damage and can maintain an action to recover for such damage
- will be precluded in most instances.
"Id at 836.
sSee Sections III, VI and VII for discussion of Damage Rule.
"See DiPietro v. Hecker, 43 Misc. 2d 630, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 704 (1984); Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Reynolds,
3 A.D.2d 686, 159 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1957). See also Albany Say. Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes &
Judge, 95 A.D. 2d 918, 463 N.Y.S. 2d 896 (1983); Brainard v. Brown, 91 A.D.2d 287, 458 N.Y.S. 2d 735
(1983). Contra: Sinopoli v. Cocozza, 105 A.D. 2d 743, 481 N.Y.S. 2d 177 (1984); Kramer v. Belfi, 106 A.D.
2d 615, 482 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (1984). For a discussion of the differing views in New York and their bases, see
Section VIII, infra, at the point where Video Corporation of America v. Frederick Flatto Associates, Inc.,
58 N.Y.S. 2d 1026, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (1983), is discussed.
'Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
"Moorehead v. Miller, 102 F.R.D. 834 (V.I. 1984).
'
2SeeGlens Falls Insurance Co. v. Reynolds, 3 A.D.2d 686, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 95 (1957). See, also, Albany Say.
Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, 95 A.D.2d 918, 463 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1983); Brainard v.
Brown, 91 A.D. 2d 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1983). Contra: Sinopoli v. Cocozza, 105 A.D. 2d 743, 481
N.Y.S. 2d 177 (1984); Kramer v. Belfi, 106 A.D. 2d 615, 482 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (1984). For a discussion of the
differing views in New York and their bases, see Section VIII, infra, at the point where Video Corporation v.
Frederick Flatto Associates, Inc., 58 N.Y.S. 2d 1026, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 439 (1983), is discussed.
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Second: Application of the contract or tort statute of limitations may de-
pend upon the nature of the injury alleged in the pleadings and the damages re-
quested. In Hillhouse v. McDowell,63 the plaintiff sought to have the longer
contract statute of limitations applied, rather than the shorter statute for
negligence, in order to prevent the action from being time-barred. The court
distinguished Bland v. Smith," which applied the tort statute of limitations. In
that case "the plaintiff not only based his action upon tort but also upon in-
juries to his person and therefore this one year [tort] statute applied"' (em-
phasis added). The court stated that the six-year contract statute was ap-
plicable only where the recovery sought was based upon contract, and no ele-
ment of personal injury." Furthermore, in Bland, "it was obvious that the
plaintiff was seeking punitive damages as well as compensatory damages"67
(emphasis added). Punitive damages, the court observed, are generally allowed
only in certain tort actions and not in actions for breach of contract."
Although the plaintiff sought to have the contract statute of limitations
applied in Hillhouse, the principles of that case may be applied in cir-
cumstances where, to have a viable action, it is necessary for the plaintiff to
avoid the consequences of the Wilcox doctrine. Thus, if a jurisdiction applies
the occurrence rule to breach of contract actions, and the damage rule to tort
actions, the problem of having the statute of limitations expire before plaintiff
suffers actual damage (as in Wilcox) will be prevented if the plaintiff alleges
personal injury or requests punitive damages in his complaint, because this will
cause the court to treat the action as one in tort. This could prevent dismissal
on the pleadings where the contract period of limitation has expired, but the
tort period of limitation has not expired, measuring from the time actual
damage was sustained, and the allegation of personal injury or the request for
punitive damages causes the court to treat the action as one in tort.
Assuming a court is prepared to follow this view, important questions still
remain to be answered. What should the result be if the plaintiff, as a matter of
law, fails to establish personal injury or entitlement to punitive damages upon
the trial of the action? Should the court, rather than sending the case to the
jury, dismiss the action on the ground that the tort statute of limitations does
not apply, and measuring from the time of breach, the contract period of
limitation has expired? What if the facts warrant the questions of personal in-
jury or entitlement to punitive damages going to the jury? Should the court ask
for a special verdict, and if the jury finds neither personal injury nor punitive
damages, dismiss the action at that time on the ground that the tort statute of
63219 Tenn. 362, 410 S.W. 2d 162 (1966).
1197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (1954).
6219 Tenn. 362, 366, 410 S.W. 2d 162, 163 (1966).
"Id.
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limitations does not apply, and measuring from the time of breach the contract
period of limitation has expired? Applying Hillhouse, it appears that the
answers to these questions should be in the affirmative.
Third: An interesting question may be posed as to whether, if there is a
breach of contract by an attorney, this is to be treated as breach of an express
contract or an implied contract. In Hiihouse, the court stated that the action
was based upon an attorney-client relationship of trust and "in addition to be-
ing an implied contract it was an express contract that he [the attorney] would
exercise reasonable skill and diligence in doing what was undertaken...61
Even if a court were to apply the occurrence rule to both the breach of an
express contract and an implied contract, the statute of limitations in a
jurisdiction may differ for each of them. The result in a particular case, i.e.,
whether the period of limitation has expired, may be determined by whether a
court concludes that the legal malpractice action involves the breach of an ex-
press or an implied contract. If Hillhouse is applied, the plaintiff should have a
choice of remedies. But, notwithstanding the conclusion in Hillhouse, it is
questionable whether the obligation that an attorney "exercise reasonable skill
and diligence in doing what was undertaken""0 may be properly considered an
express contract.
Fourth: The argument may be advanced that in all instances where an at-
torney negligently performs legal services, the client should be entitled to main-
tain an action in tort, even if the attorney's conduct also involves a breach of
contract. This is consistent with the principle that where conduct results in
both a breach of contract and a tort, the plaintiff has a choice of remedies.71
Furthermore, if the action is treated as one in tort for negligence, under tradi-
tional concepts, the damage rule should be applied." Application of these prin-
ciples would effectively circumvent the Wilcox doctrine and preclude the
possibility of the statute of limitations expiring on the client's cause of action
before the client sustains actual damage.
Fifth: The position may be taken that irrespective of whether the action is
treated as one for breach of contract or for tort, there can be no recovery in the
absence of actual damage, and the statute of limitations therefore begins to run
only after actual damage has been sustained. Recent developments in the
substantive law of legal malpractice, and an examination of Duke & Co. v.
Anderson," provide a viable basis for this conclusion.
In Duke, the action was assumpsit, and the allegation was that the at-
"Id at 371, 410 S.W. 2d at 166.
70Id.
7"See PROSSER ON TORTS § 92 (5th Ed. 1984).
"PROSSER ON TORTS § 30 (5th Ed. 1984); Note, supra note 9, at 1201.
7275 Pa. Super. 65, 418 A.2d 613 (1980).
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torney had failed to file a defamation action after agreeing that he would file
"some kind of a notice"7 with respect thereto. Plaintiffs position was that
even though it was determined in advance that no actual loss occurred, still,
"so long as the action is in assumpsit rather than trespass, the case should go to
the jury so that the jury may enter an award of nominal damages."75 This em-
braces the Wilcox doctrine, but was rejected by the court in Duke. The court
in Duke sustained a compulsory nonsuit against the plaintiff on the ground
that it had failed to show any injury, because plaintiff had failed to prove that
it would have been successful in a defamation action if the attorney had in-
stituted such an action on its behalf. The court concluded that where it is al-
leged that an attorney has breached his professional obligations to his client,
"an essential element of the cause of action, whether the action be
denominated in assumpsit or trespass, is proof of actual loss."76 This articulates
a standard pursuant to which it appears that actual damage must occur for a
legal malpractice action to accrue, in either tort or contract, and it would
follow that actual damage must occur before the statute of limitations begins
to run.
The Duke court recognized that its holding might be contrary to earlier
Pennsylvania cases, but pointed out that when the earlier cases were decided,
"the law of malpractice had not developed to the point it has reached today."77
A substantial body of substantive law has now developed in legal malpractice
to the effect that if the attorney, due to wrongful conduct, fails in the prosecu-
tion or defense of an action, the client is not entitled to recover against the at-
torney unless the client would have been successful in the prosecution or
defense of the action." The holding in Duke requires that in a legal malpractice
action predicated upon wrongful failure of an attorney to prosecute an action,
actual damage must be proven for the action to succeed. The language of the
court, quoted above, is clearly broad enough to cover all legal malpractice ac-
tions. In any event, if actual damage is required in legal malpractice actions
arising in factual situations such as that in Duke, this requirement should,
logically and equitably, be extended to all legal malpractice actions.
Another aspect of Duke causes serious difficulty, but may be turned to an
advantage, upon analysis and revision. The court indicated that no purpose is
served by creating two distinct classes of malpractice actions, each with its own
rule of damages, "according to whether the action was denominated as an ac-
tion in assumpsit or an action in trespass."79 This was coupled with the court's
'Id at 67, 418 A.2d at 614.
"Id. at 73, 418 A.2d at 617.
16Id.
"Id
"See. e.g., Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275 Pa. Super 65, 418 A.2d 613 (1980); Lieberman v. Employers In-
surance of Wausau, 171 N.J. Super. 39, 407 A.2d 1256 (1979), modified, 84 N.J. 325, 419 A.2d 417 (1980);
Zych v. Jones, 84 III. App. 3d 647, 40 I11. Dec. 369, 406 N.E. 2d 70 (1980).
"Duke & Company v. Anderson, 275 Pa. Super. 65, 73, 74, 418 A.2d 613, 617 (1980).
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conclusion that, if the action is in trespass, the client is required to prove actual
loss if the case is to get to the jury.8' The court cites Pennsylvania authority for
this last proposition. However, this is not the traditional and generally
developed common law rule that has evolved subsequent to the Statute of
Westminster II (1285). s' In addition, under traditional and generally developed
common law principles, a legal malpractice action would not meet the re-
quirements for an action of trespass. In Leame v. Bray,82 it was held that either
trespass or trespass on the case lies for negligent conduct that directly causes
injury, but only trespass on the case lies for negligence that indirectly causes
injury. The damage that results from an attorney's negligent failure to file an
action (if there is damage) indirectly results from the attorney's negligence.
Therefore, in invoking the common law forms of action as a basis for decision
in this area, it would generally be proper to invoke the action of trespass on the
case, and not trespass.
The following basis for decision would in most instances be correct, if a
court chooses to invoke the common law forms of action: 1) The proper com-
mon law form of action for legal malpractice is trespass on the case, because
the wrongful conduct of the attorney indirectly causes damage; 2) In trespass
on the case, "unlike trespass, damage is usually an essential element of
liability" 3; 3) Therefore, a legal malpractice action must be treated as one in
trespass on the case, and actual damage must occur for the action to accrue,
and for the statute of limitations to begin to run.
VI. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE DAMAGE RULE - WHEN DAMAGE OCCURS
Even where courts adhere to the damage rule in legal malpractice actions,
a surprisingly broad spectrum of criteria has been developed in various jurisdic-
tions to determine when damage occurs for the purpose of causing an action to
accrue. It has been said that an action accrues when damages are ascer-
tainable;" when there is identifiable and appreciable loss;5 when substantial in-
jury is first caused; 6 and when the alleged negligence is irremediable.
In terms of particular applications, it has been said that an action accrues
on the date when a negligently drafted settlement agreement is entered into;88
"Id. at 73-74, 418 A.2d at 617 (1980).
"113 Edw. I, c. 24 (1285), 1 Pickering's Statutes at Large 196,
13 East. 593, 102 Eng. Rep. 724 (1803).
1"J. KOFFLER, COMMON LAW PLEADING, 187 (1969).
"See, e.g., Jarmillo v. Hood, 93 N.M. 433, 601 P.2d 66 (1979); Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W. 2d 307 (Mo. 1977)
(en banc).
'See, e.g., Luick v. Rademacher, 129 Mich. App. 803, 342 N.W.2d 617 (1983).
"See, e.g., Pancake House Inc. v. Redmond, 239 Kan. 83, 716 P.2d 575 (1986).
"7See, e.g., Banton v. Marks, 623 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tenn. App. 1981); Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969).
"See, e.g., Arizona Management Corp. v. Kallof, 142 Ariz. 64, 688 P.2d 710 (1984).
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when a tax penalty is assessed for failure to file a return; 9 or when plaintiff is
notified of a tax assessment.1° Where the beneficiary of a will is suing an at-
torney for alleged negligence in drafting a will, thereby causing loss to the
beneficiary, the action may accrue upon the death of the testator.91
In Jepson v. Stubbs,92 the court applied the principle that an action ac-
crues when damage is ascertainable. The court was confronted with various
factual choices as to when this occurred. The action was brought by the plain-
tiff against his former attorney, alleging negligence in connection with the at-
torney's representation of the plaintiff on a charge of refusing to submit to in-
duction into military service, as a result of which plaintiff was convicted and
imprisoned. By statute it was provided that an action acrued when "the dam-
age resulting therefrom [from the wrong] is sustained and is capable of ascer-
tainment . ..9
The court held that the action accrued and the statute of limitations
began to run when the plaintiff was released from confinement and placed on
parole for the remainder of his term. At that time, the court reasoned, the
plaintiff was in a position to inform the jury that his actual imprisonment con-
tinued to that date, and that he would be on parole for the remainder of his
term. The court stated that the "[p]laintiff has not suggested anything affecting
the elements or extent of his damage"'9 which could have been proven at a
later date that could not have been proven on the date he was released from
confinement and placed on parole (emphasis added). This reasoning of the
court is consistent with the conclusion that it would require that all of the
damage be ascertainable before the action accrues. If the court were to explicit-
ly adopt this position, it would be harsh and unmanageable. It would be unfair
to require a client to delay his action if substantial damage has occurred simply
because additional damage might occur. Furthermore, it may frequently be
speculative as to whether additional damage will occur.
Many courts, when requiring that the damage be ascertainable for an ac-
tion to accrue, clearly do not require that all of the damage must be ascer-
tainable. But these courts have sharp differences as to what meets the ascer-
tainable test. Thus, in Jepson the court specifically rejected the view that ascer-
tainable means discoverable, observing that the legislature, in establishing the
"capable of ascertainment" test "does not establish a rule of discovery" 95 for
purposes of determining when the cause of action accrues and the statute of
limitations begins to run. On the other hand, in Jaramillo v. Hood, 6 the court
'United States v. Gutterman, 701 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1983).
"Snipes v. Jackson, 69 N.C. App. 64, 316 S.E.2d 657 (1984).
9Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969).
11555 S.w.2d 307 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
93Id. at 309, citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.100 (1969).
94Id. at 312.
95Id.
%93 N.M. 433, 601 P.2d 66 (1979).
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concluded that the cause of action did not accrue "until the harm or damage
was ascertainable or discoverable." 97 If a jurisdiction has adopted the ascer-
tainable test for damage, but not the discovery rule, the Jaramillo conclusion
(which appears to equate ascertainable with discoverable) might be used to in-
troduce the discovery rule "by the back door." The court might simply con-
clude (if its view of policy favored the discovery rule) that the discovery rule in
fact existed in the jurisdiction because of the requirement that damage be
ascertainable. Or, a court might conclude that the policy favoring the
discovery rule is so firmly established that a necessary and proper result is to
expressly adopt the discovery rule in the jurisdiction.
In Banton v. Marks98 the court adopted the view that a legal malpractice
action accrues as of the date the alleged negligence of the attorney becomes "ir-
remediable."" It was alleged in this case that the attorney negligently allowed
the statute of limitations to run on his client's medical malpractice action. The
court stated that if there was malpractice by the attorney, the injury occurred
on "the date on which the statute of limitations prevented plaintiff from filing
suit against the [sic] alleged doctor and medical facility. '' t° On that date, "the
alleged negligence was 'irremediable'."'' °'
The conclusion in Banton is disarmingly simple. But in AMFACDistribu-
tion Corp. v. Miller, 02 which involved alleged malpractice of an attorney in the
course of litigation, the court approved the view that the cause of action ac-
crued "when the plaintiff knew or should reasonably have known of the
malpractice and when plaintiffs damages are certain and not contingent upon
the outcome of an appeal"'03 (emphasis added).
Assume a case where an attorney has apparently allowed the period of
limitation to run on his client's claim. Before a legal malpractice action is com-
menced against him by the client, the attorney commences the underlying ac-
tion on behalf of the client, with the apparent purpose of alleging that, on some
ground, the statute has been tolled. This may be a good faith effort to pursue
the client's claim, or it may be a dilatory tactic to preclude the client from in-
stituting a legal malpractice action against the attorney at that time. Even if
the action is then dismissed on the ground that the period of limitation has ex-
pired, can the attorney further preclude a legal malpractice action at this time
by advising the client to institute an appeal? It would appear that he could
under Miller.
'Id. at 434, 601 P.2d at 67.
"623 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. App. 1981).
"Id. at 116.
10d.
"138 Ariz. 155, 673 P.2d 795, affd 138 Ariz. 152, 673 P.2d 792 (1983) (en banc).
"'Id. at 156, 673 P.2d at 796.
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At this point, the client may be induced to settle his legal malpractice
claim against the attorney rather than submit to the further expense and delay
of an appeal. If the attorney throughout has acted in good faith, this result
may be appropriate. But if the attorney filed the action on the client's claim
after the limitations period had expired as a dilatory tactic, the result may be
far from just. The client may at this time be induced to accept less in settle-
ment of his legal malpractice claim than the client would otherwise accept, in
order to avoid the additional time, expense and burden of an appeal.
But, it may be asked, why shouldn't the client simply advise the attorney
not to proceed with the appeal? The answer is that a well informed client will
learn that if he does not appeal, but at this point in time brings a legal malprac-
tice action, he may be required to prove that an appeal would have been unsuc-
cessful. 104 This implies time, expense, and uncertainty, if he rejects the at-
torney's advice to appeal. The viable alternatives, at this time, may be to ap-
peal or settle his claim for legal malpractice for less than the client would other-
wise accept.
Is there a solution to this problem? A rule could be evolved to the effect
that if a patently frivolous appeal is recommended by an attorney, and acceded
to by the client, and is unsuccessful, punitive damages may be awarded in a
subsequent legal malpractice action. A reasonable ceiling might be established
(by ratio or otherwise) as to the amount recoverable in punitive damages in
such a circumstance. Similarly, punitive damages might be made recoverable
for originally commencing the action on the client's behalf after the limitation
period had expired, if this was patently frivolous.
VII. QUANTUM OF DAMAGES REQUIRED BY VARYING PRINCIPLES
The question of when damage occurs for the purpose of causing a legal
malpractice action to accrue, discussed above, may inexorably be bound to the
question of how much damage is required for this purpose. There is burgeon-
ing authority that looks to the quantum of damage in determining whether an
action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run, and does not require
a showing of "all."' 5 Where a jurisdiction applies the discovery rule,' ° it may
be necessary that the damage is ascertainable before the statute of limitations
will begin to run, if the word ascertainable is used synonomously with
discoverable."7
"'See, e.g., AMFAC Distribution Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 155,673 P.2d 795, affd 138 Ariz. 152,673 P.2d
792 (1983).
'See, e.g., Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (1971) (En Banc); North-
western National Insurance Co. v. Osborne, 573 F. Supp. 1045 (E.D. Kentucky 1983); Arizona Manage-
ment Corp. v. Kallof, 142 Ariz. 64, 688 P.2d 710 (1984); Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186
(1984); Luick v. Rademacher, 129 Mich. App. 803, 342 N.W.2d 617 (1983): Wall v. Lewis, 366 N.W.2d 471
(N.D. 1985); Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 273 S.E. 2d 16 (1980).
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Budd v. Nixen, "I a case to which many courts pay homage"° on the ques-
tion of the quantum of damage necessary for an action to accrue, is impressive
for its elusiveness on this question. The opinion employs a vast range of con-
cepts, and is also self-contradictory. In Budd, the court applies the damage rule
together with the discovery rule, and holds that a legal malpractice action in
tort does not accrue until the client both sustains damage and discovers or
should discover his cause of action.
On the question of damages, the court states that "[a]ny appreciable and
actual harm"'' (emphasis added) flowing from the attorney's negligent con-
duct establishes a cause of action upon which the client may sue. But in the
very next sentence the court states that, once having discovered his attorney's
negligence and "having suffered some damage, the client must institute his ac-
tion within the time prescribed in the statute of limitations,""' (emphasis add-
ed) or he will be barred from thereafter complaining about the attorney's con-
duct. These criteria obviously differ.
The opinion generates additional problems. The court observes that plain-
tiff alleges in his complaint that "he was compelled to incur and pay attorneys
fees and legal costs and expenditures.""' Then, after enumerating attorney's
fees that the plaintiff allegedly paid, the court states that if the defendant's
negligence caused plaintiff "to incur or pay such fees""' more than two years
prior to the institution of the legal malpractice action, plaintiff's action would
be barred by the statute of limitations. As there is no way of knowing whether
the court chose its language carefully, or whether this difference in language
between the plaintiffs allegations and the court's opinion is the result of in-
advertance, presumably "or" must be treated as the operative word on the
question of attorney's fees.
Furthermore, as plaintiff's complaint alleged that plaintiff was compelled
to "incur and pay attorney's fees and legal costs and expenditures,""' the ques-
tion arises as to whether incurring and paying legal costs and expenditures is a
sufficient basis for finding adequate damage, so as to cause the action to accrue
and the statute of limitations to begin running. Additionally, must legal costs
and expenditures be both incurred and paid, or is it enough if they are only in-
curred? The court does not address this question.
'116 Cal. 3d 195, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433 (1971) (en banc).
"'See, e.g., Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Osborne, 573 F. Supp. 1045 (E.D. Kentucky 1983);
Arizona Management Corp. v. Kollof, 142 Ariz. 64,688 P.2d 710 (Ariz. App. 1984); Rosnick v. Marks, 218
Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186 (Neb. 1984); Luick v. Rademacher, 129 Mich. App. 803, 342 N.W.2d 617 (1983);
Wall v. Lewis, 366 N.W.2d 471 (N.D. 1985); Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 273 S.E.2d
16 (1980); Levin v. Berley, 728 F.2d 551 (1st. Cir. 1984).
"*Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 201, 98 Cal. Reptr. 849, 852, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (1971).
H"Id. at 201, 98 Cal. Reptr. at 853, 491 P.2d at 437.
112 d
"'Id. at 202, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 853, 491 P.2d at 437.
"'Id. at 201, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 853, 491 P.2d at 437.
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The possible consequences of Budd are startling, although this fact has
been left masked by the many courts that have rushed to cite the opinion, and
quote its language at length on the question of damages. These are the
possibilities:
If Budd is applied in a jurisdiction that follows the damage rule in a tort
action (as Budddid), and not the discovery rule (contrary to Budd), the plaintiff
will usually be no better off in a tort action under the damage rule than he is in
a contract action under Wilcox v. Plummer, "I where the occurrence rule is ap-
plied. This is so because some legal fee is usually incurred when, or shortly af-
ter, an attorney is retained (where the retainer is not on a contingent basis). If
"some"' 6 damage is all that is required (as per one statement in Budd), then
usually at the moment of retainer, or shortly thereafter, adequate damage has
been sustained to satisfy the damage requirement in a tort action for legal mal-
practice. Therefore, when the attorney is negligent some time later, the action
immediately accrues under the damage rule, as sufficient damage had previ-
ously been incurred to cause this result. Even if "appreciable" harm is re-
quired"7 (as per one statement in Budd), it appears that the result would usual-
ly be the same, as relatively modest legal expenses were testified to by plaintiff
in response to interrogatories in Budd, and the court remanded the case to the
lower court for a determination as to when (not in what amount) damage oc-
curred."8
Even more startling is that a similar result will usually occur where the
damage rule and the discovery rule are both applied in a tort action for legal
malpractice. It will usually be the simplest of tasks to establish that the client
knew or should have known that he had incurred attorney's fees at or about
the time of retainer (where the retainer is not on a contingent basis), and that
therefore both damage and discovery of damage exist when the attorney, at a
later date, is negligent. What is terribly unfortunate - and contrary to the
policy that supports the discovery rule - is that the discovery rule is aimed at
fairness, and this undercuts fairness. This is so because a client may - as a
reasonable person - simply not think of accrued and unpaid legal fees as
damage. Yet, their existence may cause the period of limitation to expire on
the claim of a client who does not initiate a legal malpractice action based upon
the existence of accrued and unpaid legal fees. It is difficult to imagine that
courts, applying the discovery rule, would knowingly condone such a result,
which might in some circumstances be described as entrapment of the client.
It would seem that it was never intended that a tort action for legal
malpractice, applying the damage rule and the discovery rule, should where
"'29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
"'See, e.g., Budd, 201, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 853, 491 P.2d at 437.
"'Id at 201, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 852, 491 P.2d at 436.
"'Id. at 203-204, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 854, 491 P.2d at 438.
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unfairness occurs, lead to the same result as a contract or tort action applying
the occurrence rule and without the discovery rule. The first set of principles
(discovery rule and damage rule) are presumably applied to maximize the pro-
tection of the client, while the second set of principles (occurrence rule without
the discovery rule) generally minimize the client's protection. Yet in the con-
text of accrued and unpaid legal fees, as indicated, they would both minimize
the protection of the client. A method of avoiding the quagmire into which the
accrued legal fee criteria of Budd can lead, is for the courts to simply reject this
aspect of Budd.
VIII. DETERMINING WHICH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES IN LEGAL
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
In this section focus is on the nature of the problems that arise, and con-
siderations and criteria applied, in determining what statute of limitations will
apply in a legal malpractice action. Where there is a statute in a jurisdiction
that by its terms specifically applies to malpractice, the question may never-
theless be raised as to whether this statute is applicable to legal malpractice, or
is confined to malpractice actions of a different nature, such as medical
malpractice. Where a statute is found to apply to legal malpractice actions, the
question arises as to whether the statute applies to all, or only some, legal
malpractice actions. If interpreted not to apply to all legal malpractice actions,
issues arise as to what statutes of limitations apply in particular cases, and this
may involve an exploration of numerous factors and considerations, with vary-
ing degrees of complexity.
In Ohio, the statute of limitations expressly states that it covers, among
other actions, "malpractice."" 9 In discussing the applicability of this statute to
legal malpractice, an Ohio Court of Appeals observes that malpractice "con-
sists of 'the professional misconduct of members of the medical profession and
attorneys'. "120 Having thus determined that misconduct of attorneys is gov-
erned by this statute, the court concludes that the statute applies whether the
professional misconduct is grounded in tort or contract. In the process of arriv-
ing at these conclusions the court apparently reaches for the ultimate in direct-
ness when it states, "malpractice by any other name still constitutes malprac-
tice.""'2
In Johnson v. Haugland, "I the essence of the complaint was that defen-
dants had breached their professional duty to the plaintiff by negligently
handling his defense in an action, and failing to inform him of a conflict of in-
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (1981).
"'Muir v. Hadler Real Estate Management Co., 4 Ohio App. 3d 89, 446 N.E. 2d 820, 822 (1982) (citing,
Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 372, 199 N.E. 2d 878 (1964)).
"1id. at 91, 446 N.E. 2d at 822.
122303 N.W. 2d 533 (N.D. 1981).
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terest. A statute of limitations was provided for actions to recover for damages
resulting from "malpractice,"'' but plaintiff sought application of a different
and longer statute of limitations. The Supreme Court of North Dakota con-
cluded that because a determination of which statute of limitations is ap-
plicable in a given case "turns on the nature of the subject matter and because
the nature of Johnson's claim regarding the attorneys in this case is profes-
sional malpractice,"'24 the malpractice statute applies. The court ultimately
relies upon a statutory rule of construction.'25
The court refers in a footnote to an early Ohio decision 6 where, in apply-
ing to attorneys a one year "malpractice" statute of limitations that had
previously been applied to physicians, rather than a six year contract statute of
limitations, the Ohio court states: "No reason is conceivable why a physician
should live down liability for his blunders in one year while a lawyer should
fear his luckless client's shadow for five more years." '27 The Ohio court was
referring to the six-year limitation in the statute governing breach of implied
contracts. The court in Johnson also observes that the Ohio court "reasoned
that a contrary holding would force a conclusion that the legislature '...
undertook to discriminate in favor of the medical profession against that to
which doubtless a great many of its members belong'."'28 Query whether this is
an appropriate method of determining legislative intent. It appears that the
Ohio court was envisioning (if it had held to the contrary) an enclave of in-
vulnerability for physicians. 2
In a long but carefully structured opinion, the Supreme Court of
Michigan in Sam v. Balardo 3 concluded that the legislative intent was to in-
clude legal malpractice within a statute of limitations covering "actions charg-
ing malpractice."'' As originally enacted .. 19C5 the statute provided that "all
"'N.C. Cent. Code 28-01-18(3) (1974).
"'Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W. 2d 533, 538-39 (N.D. 1981).
I23 d. at 539, n.4:
While recognizing that any alleged professional malpractice may be framed generally in either tort or
contract theory, the statute of limitation regarding these general theories is not applicable when a
special statute of limitations as to the malpractice exists. This conclusion is derived from application
of Section 1-02-07, N.D.C.C., which reads:
"1-02-07. Particular controls general. - Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in con-
flict with a special provision in the same or in another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible,
so that effect may be given to both provisions, but if the conflict between the two provisions is ir-
reconcilable the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general
provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest legilative in-
tent that such general provision shall prevail."
126Long v. Bowersox, 8 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 249, 19 Ohio Dec. 494, (1909).
"'Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W. 2d 533, 539, n.5 (N.D. 1981), quoting from Long v. Bowersox, 8 Ohio
N.P. (n.s.) 249, 256, 19 Ohio Dec. 494, 500 (1909), except that phrase in Long is "five years more," rather
than "five more years."
'ind.
12 See Section IX(B) for discussion, in another context, of an enclave of invunerability for attorneys.
"-411 Mich. 405, 308 N.W. 2d 142 (1981).
" Id. at 427, 308 N.W. 2d at 151 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(3) (West 1968).
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actions against physicians, surgeons and dentists for malpractice shall be com-
menced within two years." ' The court referred to such professionals as being
"protected by the short two-year limitation period"'3 (emphasis added). Focus-
ing on what it considered to be the protective nature of the statute, the court
pointed out that the 1961 amendment which deleted the words "physicians,
surgeons and dentists" from the malpractice statute of limitations
demonstrated a legislative intent to include attorneys. A public policy argu-
ment advanced by the court to support this conclusion is that because at-
torneys are called upon "to make decisions that involve the exercise of in-
dependent professional judgment of essentially the same serious quality as
those made by a physician,"'3 4 they are "deserving of the same protection"'3 5 of
a two year statute of limitations. It appears that the reasoning fails to ascribe
sufficient weight to the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client, the
dependence of the client, and the client's deserving protection. In all fairness,
however, it must be observed that the Michigan courts and legislature have
through the decision making process, followed by legislative enactments,
adopted both a last treatment rule (a form of continuous representation rule)
and a discovery rule for the protection of clients in the attorney-client relation-
ship.'36 While the Michigan statute is wanting in some respects, as indicated in
the analysis of that statute,'37 it does show that as a jurisdictional entity
Michigan has been striving to protect the client with a view toward fundamen-
tal fairness.
In Barnard v. Dilly,38 plaintiff contended on appeal that the trial court
had improperly applied the Michigan malpractice statute of limitations to her
claims, rather than statutes governing contract or general negligence. The
court concluded that the claim was grounded only on malpractice and not in
contract because the agreement between attorney and client was not one to
perform "a specific act, but one to exercise appropriate legal skill in providing
representation in a lawsuit."' 39
The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that defendant was liable to
her on the general theory of negligence. The court states that "Itlo establish a
tort, one must first establish a duty to the claimant imposed on the alleged tort-
feasor,"'1° and the only claim of duty here "arises out of the attorney-client
relationship," and "[wihere the alleged duty arises out of such a relationship,
"Id. at 432, 308 N.W.2d at 153.
111d at 432, 308 N.W.2d at 153-154.
"4d. at 435, 308 N.W.2d at 155.
'11d. at 436, 308 N.W.2d at 155.
"See Section X(B).
... 134 Mich. App. 375, 350 N.W. 2d 887 (1984).
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the tort claim is one for malpractice and malpractice only." 4'
A triptych of Indiana cases adds additional perspective in this area. In
Shideler v. Dwyer, 4 the Supreme Court of Indiana, in construing a statute of
limitations that applied to "physicians, dentists, surgeons, hospitals, san-
itariums, or others,"4 3 found that under the doctrine of usudem generis, "or
others" applied "to others of the medical care community."'" Therefore, the
statute does not apply to legal malpractice. In this action, plaintiff alleged that
a will had been improperly drafted, causing her as a beneficiary, to be deprived
of monthly monetary payments. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that
the contract statute of limitations applied, and concluded that the two year
statute of limitations for injury to personal property ' 5 was applicable, stating
that this "governs all actions involving claimed losses of 'rights and interests in
or to' personal property."'"
Almost two years later, in Whitehouse v. Quinn, 47 the Court of Appeals
of Indiana, Second Circuit, concluded that the plaintiffs complaint was
predicated upon nonperformance of a promise contained in a written contract
and thus governed by the applicable twenty-year limitation period provided by
statute.4  The court distinguishes Shideler by pointing out, among other
things, that the plaintiff in Shideler was not the client of the attorney, but the
beneficiary of a will drafted by the attorney, and there was no express promise
the nonperformance of which formed the basis of the claim. In Whitehouse,
the written contact "is more than a mere link in a chain of evidence needed to
state the claim.' 149 The court also concludes that, "[ijn effect, the contract was
for a specific result - Quinn would 'prosecute' 'others' to final settlement or
judgment"'50 (emphasis added).
More than a year later, the Court of Appeals of Indiana, Fourth District,
in Keystone Distribution Park v. Kennerk, Dumas, Burke, Backs, Long and
Salin, "I was presented with a case in which it was alleged that the attorney
breached an oral contract with respect to assisting in procuring the issue of
economic development bonds for the client. The court refused to apply a six
4"1Id. at 379, 350 N.W. 2d at 888. See also Id., at 378, 350 N.W. 2d at 888, where the court states: "The ap-
plicable period of limitation depends upon the theory actually pled when the same set of facts can support
either of two distinct causes of action."
10417 N.E. 2d 281 (Ind. 1981).
"'IND. CODE ANN. 34-4-19-1 (Burns 1973).
'"Shideler, 417 N.E. 2d at 283.
"'IND. CODE ANN. 34-1-2-2 (Burns 1973).
''Shideler, 417 N.E. 2d at 287.
1'443 N.E. 2d 332 (Ind. App. 1982).
l'"ND. CODE ANN. 34-1-2-2(6) (Burns 1973).
"gWhitehouse v. Quinn, 443 N.E. 2d 332, 337 (Ind. App. 1982).
Mld
"-461 N.E.2d 749 (nd. App. 1984).
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year statute of limitations which governed actions for breaches of oral con-
tracts)52 As in Shideler, it held that the two year statute was applicable.' The
court expressed "serious reservations"'54 about the Whitehouse holding, in
view of the analysis in Shideler, but it added, "more to the point the
Whitehouse court indicated that it was recognizing a narrowly drawn excep-
tion based upon an express promise set forth in the written contract."'55 In
Keystone the court concludes that "the 'verbal contract' to employ the at-
torney and the attorney's alleged failure to perform, allege, in essence, the tort
of legal malpractice. The claim was governed by the two year statute"'51 6 (em-
phasis added).
This triptych of Indiana cases is thought provoking, but hardly satisfying
in terms of analysis. Shideler had ruled out application of the "malpractice"
statute in legal malpractice, by limiting its application to the medical communi-
ty, "'57 and applied the statute governing injury to personal property.'58 Keystone
concludes that the essence of the claim against the attorney is "the tort of legal
malpractice."'59 It may be questioned whether this is "the tort of legal malprac-
tice," as Keystone concludes, or, more properly understood, legal malpractice
resulting from the tort of negligence. 60 Furthermore, while most instances
where legal malpractice occurs may fall within the broad scope of the statutory
provision applied in Shideler, as this provision applies "[flor injuries to person
or character, for injuries to personal property, and for a forfeiture of penalty
given by statute,"' 6' Shideler states that another statutory provision might
"conceivably" be applicable. 62
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in two cases, developed criteria for
determining the applicable statute of limitations. In Hillhouse v. McDowell, 163
12 d. at 751, citing IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-1 (Burns 1973), which provides in part for a six-year statute of
limitations "[oin accounts and contracts not in writing."




"'Shideler v. Dwyer, 275 Ind. 270, 272, 417 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1981).
"'IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2 (Burns 1973).
"'Keystone Distribution Park v. Kennerk, Dumas, Burke, Backs, Long and Salin, 461 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ind.
App. 1984).
16OAbsent clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute of limitations which by its terms applies to "mal-
practice," should not be construed to terminate rights clients would otherwise have to maintain actions un-
der existing theories of liability. Statutes of limitations are intended as statutes of repose, and absent clear
legislative intent should not be construed to truncate existing rights. Thus, for example, they should not
form a basis for denying a client a right of action in contract, if absent this statute of limitations the client
would otherwise have such a right, unless it is clearly established that this was the legislative intent. See
Johnson v. Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 539 (N.D. 1981), where a statutory rule of construction was found
determinative.
"'IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2(1) (Burns 1973).
"'Shideler v. Dwyer, 275 Ind. 270, 278, 417 N.E.2d 281, 286-287 (1981).
111219 Tenn. 362, 410 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1966).
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the court, in applying the six year contract statute of limitations, distinguishes
Bland v. Smith,"'6 which applied a shorter tort statute of limitations. The court
observes that in Bland the plaintiff had based his action on tort and also upon
injuries to his person, and therefore the tort statute applied. Hillhouse conclud-
ed that the contract statute is applicable only where the recovery sought is based
upon a contract, and no element of personal injury.6 In addition, the plaintiff
in Bland sought punitive damages, as well as compensatory damages, and
punitive damages, the court observed, are generally allowed in certain tort ac-
tions, but not in actions for breach of contract.'1 Hillhouse provides a basis for
asserting that the tort statute should apply where the plaintiff frames his
pleading in tort, and also bases his action on injuries to the person, with the re-
quest for punitive damages being an added basis for treating the action as one
in tort. 61
In New York, a principle had developed in legal malpractice actions to the
effect that if the contract between the attorney and client is an agreement to
obtain a specific result, and this is breached, the six year contract statute of
limitations applies, even though the breach results from negligence on the part
of the attorney; but if the breached agreement is not an agreement to obtain a
specific result, and negligence is the gravamen of the action, the three year tort
statute of limitations applies.6 '
But a relatively recent New York Court of Appeals case, Video Corpora-
tion v. Frederick Flatto Associates, Inc., 69 may have a profound effect in this
area. Video is not a legal malpractice action, but is an action against an in-
surance broker for failure to provide adequate coverage. The court takes note
of its earlier holding in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Association, 7 which was
an action against architects, that had been characterized as professional
malpractice, 7' and concludes "an action for failure to exercise due care in the
performance of a contract insofar as it seeks recovery for damages to property
or precuniary interests recoverable in a contract action is governed by the six
year contract Statute of Limitations"'7 (emphasis added). This conclusion is
reached in the context of the New York statutory scheme which specifically
provides a three year statute of limitations for "an action to recover damages
'"197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (Tenn. 1955).
61219 Tenn. 362, 366, 410 S.w.2d 162, 163 (1966).
'"Id. at 366, 410 S.W.2d at 164.
"7See Section V for a fuller discussion of Hillhouse v. McDowell, 219 Tenn. 362, 410 S.W.2d 162 (1966) and
Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (1955).
"'See Discussion in Section V.
'58 N.Y.2d 1026, 462 N.Y.S.2d 439, 448 N.E.2d 1350 (1983).
17043 N.Y.2d 389, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 372 N.E.2d 555 (1977).
"'See Video Corp. v. Flatto Assoc., 85 A.D.2d 448, 461, 448 N.Y.S.2d 498, 506 (App. Div. 1982) (Sandier,
J., dissenting) modified, 58 N.Y.2d 1026, 462 N.Y.S. 2d 439, 448 N.E.2d 1350 (1983).
1id at 1028, 462 N.Y.S. 2d at 439, 448 N.E.2d at 1350 (1983) (citing CPLR 213(2) (McKinney 1972).
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for malpractice, other than medical or dental malpractice"'7 (emphasis added).
The court in Video also states that to the extent that its previous decision
in Gilbert Properties v. Millstein7 is to the contrary, it "should not be fol-
lowed." ' Gilbert was a legal malpractice action in which the plaintiff claimed
damages on the ground that the attorney had failed to ascertain the true owner
of a building, as a consequence of which plaintiff lost his right to sue the true
owner. In Gilbert, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a holding that the
action, based on allegations of negligence, was time-barred by the three year
malpractice statute of limitations.'76
Video, by holding that the six year contract statute of limitations applies
where the complaint is the defendant's negligence in the performance of a con-
tract insofar as plaintiff seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary
interests recoverable in a contract action, applies a concept different from that
which has been followed in legal malpractice actions in New York, as well as a
number of other jurisdictions, that the contract statute of limitations applies
only where the contract breached is one to obtain a specific result.'77
An assault upon the conclusion that Video should be controlling in legal
malpractice actions, might be mounted by urging that Video was not a
malpractice action; Sears Roebuck, at most, was an action for architect's
malpractice; the situation with respect to attorneys is significantly different
from that of insurance brokers and architects, and therefore, Video is
distinguishable and should not be applied in legal malpractice actions.
But a New York Appellate Division decision, Sinopoli v. Cocozza, "I and a
similar decision that followed,'79 have already found Video controlling in legal
malpractice actions. The court in Sinopoli states that it is aware of contrary
decisions of the Appellate Division in Albany Say. Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff,
Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, 80 and Brainard v. Brown,"' but finds them "unper-
suasive."' 82 The court observes that "Brainard relied upon the reversed Ap-
pellate Division decision in Video . . ." " and Albany "simply followed
Brainard and did not analyze the effect of [the Court of Appeals decision in]
1
"CPLR 214(6) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
1 33 N.Y.2d 857, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198, 307 N.E.2d 257 (1973).
'"Video, 58 N.Y.2d at 1028, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 439, 448 N.E.2d at 1350 (1983).
"16Gilbert Properties, 33 N.Y.2d at 858-859, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 199, 307 N.E.2d at 257, citing CPLR 214(6)
(McKinney 1972).
" See Discussion in Section V.
1105 A.D.2d 743, 481 N.Y.S.2d 177 (App. Div. 1984).
"'Kramer v. Belfi, 106 A.D.2d 615, 482 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App. Div. 1984).
"-95 A.D.2d 918, 463 N.Y.S.2d 896 (App. Div. 1983).
1'91 A.D.2d 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735 (App. Div. 1983).
"'Sinopoli v. Cocozza, 105 A.D.2d 743, 481 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (App. Div. 1984).
1id. at 743, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
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Video..." ",s Brainard was in fact decided before the Court of Appeals handed
down its decision in Video, and Albany was decided about two and one half
months after the Court of Appeals decision in Video.
The Sinopoli court is correct in observing that Albany did not analyze the
effect of the Court of Appeals decision in Video, as it in fact made no reference
to that decision. It applied what had been the traditional view in legal malprac-
tice in New York, that the contract statute of limitations applies to attorney-
client agreements "only when there [is] a promise to perform and no subse-
quent performance, or when the attorney has explicitly undertaken to
discharge a specific task and then failed to do so." '' s The Albany court's failure
to take cognizance of the Court of Appeal's decision in Video may, however,
provide the court with an opportunity to consider the same question in the
future in the context of Video, and modify its conclusion, if it deems this ad-
visable. Or, the New York Court of Appeals may ultimately make a determina-
tion as to the applicability of Video in legal malpractice actions.
IX. DISCOVERY RULES
86
A. Policy and Rationale for Discovery Rules
In order to prevent an action in legal malpractice from being barred by the
running of the statute of limitations before the client discovers, or should have
discovered the malpractice, some jurisdictions have adopted a discovery rule.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, applying the discovery rule
in Family Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello,87 a legal malpractice action
based upon a defect in title, held that the time when the right of action accrued
and the statute of limitations began to run was "when the defect in title was
discovered or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been
discovered."'' 8s The court observed that although this may reflect the minority
rule, the trend of modern decisions is moving towards its adoption.
The discovery rule in legal malpractice generally finds its origin through
analogy with the discovery rule in medical malpractice. In drawing upon this
analogy, the California Supreme Court set out justification for adopting the
discovery rule in legal malpractice, in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Catchart
'"Id. at 743-744, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
"'
5Albany Sav. Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, 95 A.D.2d 918, 919, 463 N.Y.S.2d 896,
897 (App. Div. 1983).
'Statutes of limitations governing fraud generally may, in limited instances, be applicable in legal malprac-
tice actions, depending upon the nature of the statute and the nature of the wrong committed by the at-
torney. These general statutes governing fraud are not within the scope of this article, and accordingly are
not discussed.
See R. MALLEN. LEGAL MALPRACTICE. 425-487 (2d ed. 1981), and ANNOT.. 32 A.L.R.4th, 260, for a
general compilation of cases on statutes of limitations in legal malpractice actions.
' 157 W. Va. 983, 207 S.E.2d 157 (1974).
'ld. at 993, 207 S.E.2d at 163.
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& Gelfand. "9 The court observed that in ordinary tort and contract actions the
statute of limitations begins to run upon the occurrence of the last element
essential to the cause of action, and the plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of ac-
tion, or of the identity of the wrongdoer, does not toll the statute. In cases of
professional malpractice, however, "postponement of the period of limitations
until discovery finds justification in the special nature of the relationship be-
tween the professional man and his client."'11 The special obligation of the pro-
fessional is not only to use ordinary care, but to use the skill, prudence and
diligence commonly exercised by practitioners in his profession. A corollary to
the expertise of the professional, the court states, is the inability of the layman
to detect misapplication, in that the client may not recognize the negligence of
a professional when he sees it.
A person cannot be expected to know the relative medical merits of alter-
native anesthetics, nor the various exceptions to the hearsay rule. Further-
more, not only will a person fail to recognize negligence when he sees it, but
often he will lack the opportunity to see it, as where a doctor operates upon an
unconscious patient or an attorney or accountant performs his work out of the
client's view. "In the legal field, the injury may lie concealed within the obtuse
terminology of a will or contract; in the medical field the injury may lie hidden
within the patient's body; in the accounting field, the injury may lie buried in
the figures of the ledger."''
Finally, the dealings between practitioner and client frame a fiduciary
relationship, with a duty of full disclosure resting upon the fiduciary. "Where
there is a duty to disclose, the disclosure must be full and complete, and any
material concealment or misrepresentation will amount to fraud."' Although
the defendant makes no active misrepresentation, this element "is supplied by
an affirmative obligation to make full disclosure, and the non-disclosure itself
is a 'fraud'.""' Since the client's lack of awareness of a practitioner's malprac-
tice implies, in many cases, a second breach of duty by the fiduciary, a failure
to make such a full disclosure, the discovery rule "prevents the fiduciary from
obtaining immunity for an initial breach of duty by a subsequent breach of the
obligation of disclosure."' 94
B. An Enclave of Invulnerability for Attorneys
There has been a willingness on the part of some courts to apply the dis-
covery rule in medical malpractice actions, and not in legal malpractice ac-
tions. This may be symptomatic of an indifference towards the client and a
106 Cal. 3d 176, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421 (1971) (en banc).
'"Id. at 187-88, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844, 491 P.2d at 428.
11id. at 188, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844, 491 P.2d at 428.





Koffler: Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1987
AKRON LAW REVIEW
willingness to allow the bar an enclave of invulnerability not provided to other
professionals.
In Idaho, "the 'discovery' exception which tolls the accrual date for a
cause of action until the act or omission is discovered or reasonably should
have been discovered"'195 was applied in medical malpractice cases in 1964 and
1970, the first involving a foreign object, and the second a misdiagnosis. 96 Yet
in 1978, the Supreme Court of Idaho in Martin v. Clements,'97 expressly
declined to create a discovery exception for legal malpractice actions. Justice
Bistline, dissenting, states: "The Court's opinion has the virtue of judicial in-
tegrity, because undoubtedly it will wrongly be interpreted as favoritism on
behalf of the legal profession when contrasted with the Court's pioneer deci-
sions adopting discovery rules in medical malpractice cases."'9"
In Cox v. Rosser, 199 the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas took cognizance
of the fact that the discovery rule had been applied by the Supreme Court of
Texas to toll limitations in medical malpractice cases, but found "no reason' ' 2°
to exend the discovery rule to the legal malpractice action under consideration.
The court observed that the client had not alleged any act on the part of the at-
torney which prevented the client from discovering the alleged wrongful acts
on the attorney's part, nor had the client made any allegation of fraud. But an
examination of the two medical malpractice cases in which the discovery rule
had been applied, indicates that in those cases the court did not set out these re-
quirements. In one of these cases, there were allegations of intentional and
fraudulent misrepresentations, breach of implied warranty and negligence aris-
ing from the performance of a vasectomy operation on plaintiffs husband. The
court's holding, however, was not predicated upon any act by the physician
which prevented discovery of the wrongful act or on any fraud by the physi-
cian. The court's holding was direct and precise: "We hold that in malpractice
cases arising from vasectomy operations the Statute of Limitations commences
to run on the date of discovery of the true facts concerning the failure of the
operation, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and
diligence, have been discovered."' ° The other case involved alleged negligence
of surgeons in failing to remove a surgical sponge from the body of a patient
while performing a Caesarean Section.2 2
Certainly in cases of an ineffective vasectomy and a foreign object left in
"'Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 909, 575 P.2d 885, 888 (1978).
"'Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964) (foreign object); Renner v. Ed-
wards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970) (misdiagnosis).
"'98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978).
'"Id. at 911, 575 P.2d at 890 (Bistline, J., dissenting).
"579 S.W.2d 73 (rex. Civ. App. 1979).
mId. at 77.
"'Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1973).
"'Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (rex. 1967).
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the body, the very nature of the wrong may make it undiscoverable by the pa-
tient, at least for a period of time. But this is also true of many acts which in-
volve legal malpractice. As the Supreme Court of California aptly stated, a per-
son cannot be expected to know the various exceptions to the hearsay rule, and
an injury may lie concealed within the obtuse terminology of a will or con-
tract. 03 The placing of attorneys in a protected class by requiring an act by an
attorney which prevented the client from discovering the wrong, or fraud by
the attorney, creates an injustice in that such is not a requirement in the case
of a physician.
The Oklahoma law appears to have been interpreted by the federal courts
as providing for the application of the discovery rule in medical malpractice ac-
tions, but not in legal malpractice. This may be gleaned from Royal Crown
Bottling v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 204While the court in Royal Crown in-
dicates that what appears to have been the adoption of the discovery rule in a
medical malpractice case may have been dictum, it nevertheless concludes:
"Moreover, even if these cases establish a special accrual exception as to
medical malpractice cases"2 5 the plaintiff "has not shown this court any policy
considerations, analogies or precedents indicating that the exception should be
extended to attorney malpractice cases or that the Oklahoma court would so
extend it."2°0 It seems startling that the court should place attorneys in a more
favorable position than physicians, at least in part because plaintiff "has not
shown" the court policy considerations and analogies. Certainly policy con-
siderations can be independently assessed and asserted by the court, absent
brief of counsel, and the analogies are evident.2 7
To the extent that the above cases indicate courts providing an area of in-
vulnerability for attorneys not provided for other professionals, the foregoing
analysis may serve a dual function. Within jurisdictions where apparent incon-
sistencies and injustices have developed, courts may be induced to alter their
view. Perhaps even more important, where the question is dealt with in the
future as a matter of first impression, the lack of a rational basis, the illogic and
the fundamental unfairness that appears from the above, may persuade courts
that there is the danger of developing a doctrine which upon careful analysis is
abhorrent to a sense of justice.
C. Relationship of Discovery Rules to Damage Rule and Occurrence Rule.
Where a jurisdiction, having adhered to the occurrence rule or the
"
3Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.3d 176, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,491 P.2d 421 (1971).
20438 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
"'Id. at 44.
N6ld.
'6 Cal.3d 176, 188, 98 CaL.Rptr. 837, 844, 491 P.2d 421,428 (1971) ("postponement of the period of limita-
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damage rule, adopts a discovery rule, more than a substitution of rules or con-
cepts is involved, as discovery rules vary in their requirements, and there is a
relationship between the occurrence rule and the discovery rule, or the damage
rule and the discovery rule, that effects these requirements. A question to be
asked is whether the statute of limitations will be triggered at the time plaintiff
knows or should know of the occurrence of the wrongful act or omission
(which occurrence, without more, would start the statute running under the
occurrence rule), or will the statute of limitations be triggered at the time the
plaintiff knows, or should know, facts essential to establish a cause of action,
including damage, (the existence of which facts, without more, would start the
statute running under the damage rule). In this sense, a discovery rule is
superimposed upon the damage rule or the occurrence rule, or, more specifical-
ly, superimposed upon what would have been the damage rule or the occur-
rence rule, absent adoption of the discovery rule.
While the discovery rule, as applied by courts in legal malpractice actions
has frequently been superimposed upon the damage rule (or, more specifically,
what would otherwise have been the damage rule), this need not be the case. If
a court follows the occurrence rule in tort or contract, it can, with a less
wrenching effect upon the existing rule, adopt a discovery rule that measures
from the time plaintiff knows, or should know, of the occurrence of the wrong-
ful act or omission. This was done in Budd v. Nixen,208 with respect to an al-
leged breach of contract action. The court observes that in addition to alleging
an action in tort, the plaintiff in Budd had alleged an action for breach of con-
tract. "Since the cause of action for breach of such a professional service con-
tract arises on the date of the breach, and no consequential or actual damages
need be suffered to give the client a right to bring suit in contract," the court
concluded that "the statutory limitations period commences when the client
knows, or reasonably should know of the breach"'" (emphasis added).
When courts are considering a legal malpractice action as one in tort,
rather than breach of contract, they may, and should, apply the discovery rule
in conjunction with the damage rule. Why? First if a court already follows the
damage rule, this would be a natural and logical progression. But why do so
where a court applies the occurrence rule, prior to its adoption of the discovery
rule? The answer is that in adopting the discovery rule a court is reaching for a
result that is fundamentally fair, and requiring that the plaintiff know, or
should know, facts sufficient to meet all of the requirements of the action, in-
cluding damage, is more equitable than merely requiring that plaintiff know,
or should know, of the wrongful act or omission, in order to start the statute
running.
But a court may be willing to apply the discovery rule only in conjunction
2036 Cal.3d 195, 98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433 (1971).
2d. at 203 n.6, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 854 n.6, 491 P.2d at 438 n.6.
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with the occurrence rule, or what would otherwise have been the occurrence
rule. This may be so because where a court already applies the occurrence rule,
it may be unwilling, or consider itself unable, to wholly turn its back on the
underlying concept that the occurrence of the wrong triggers the statute of
limitations, but would be willing to apply a discovery rule in conjunction with
this concept. This will still provide a benefit, as it will, in certain cases, prevent
the unconscionable result that may flow from the Wilcox doctrine, discussed
in sections IV and V, supra. Requiring that the plaintiff know or should know
of the attorney's wrongful act or omission before the statute of limitations
begins to run, will mean that in certain cases where the period of limitation
would otherwise have expired by the passage of time under the occurrence
rule, an action will be timely instituted, measuring from the time plaintiff
knows or should know of the attorney's wrongful act or omission.
Many courts have not to this point been aware of the foregoing concepts,
their meaning, usability, and effect, as is indicated by the discussions and inter-
nal inconsistencies in the opinions. Thus, in Edwards v. Ford,"' where the
Supreme Court of Florida expressly states that it adopts the rationale and
language of Downing v. Vaine, 21 the court indicates that the statute of limita-
tions began to run in Edwards from the time the plaintiffs "had knowledge of
the fact that a cause of action had accrued in their favor during 1963, with ac-
companying damages (even though perhaps minimal at that point)"' (em-
phasis added). Yet, the specifically "adopted"2 "' language of Downing states:
"Under the circumstances it is our view, and we so hold, that the statute of
limitations on appellee's cause of action against appellant for damages
resulting from the latter's malpractice did not commence to run until
appellant's act of negligence became known to appellee on March 20, 1967."' 4
It therefore appears that in Edwards the court superimposes the discovery rule
upon what would otherwise be the damage rule, while the "adopted" rule of
Downing superimposes the discovery rule upon what would otherwise be the
occurrence rule.
However, an examination of the opinion in Downing indicates that while
the Downing court states that the statute of limitations did not commence to
run until appellant's act of negligence became known to appellee on March 20,
1967, the facts may be construed to indicate that the damage also became
known at that time. If this is so, the Edwards interpretation of Downing,
although not in accord with the language of that opinion, whether by chance
or otherwise, may indeed be correct. Downing may in fact be superimposing
the discovery rule upon what would otherwise be the damage rule. The fact
2'10279 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1973).
21228 So. 2d 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
2)279 So. 2d at 853.
213 Id.
211228 So. 2d at 627.
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that questions such as these permeate opinions in this area, underscores the im-
portance of making courts aware of the concepts, choices, and effects, set out
in the above analysis, in order that clear and intended choices can be made,
and justice maximized in this area.
D. Responsibilities of Persons Invoking Discovery Rules.
Differences in language in articulating the discovery rule, may be signifi-
cant in determining the result in particular cases. This is especially important
because, since the discovery rule is only now significantly emerging in legal
malpractice actions, there will be choices of language and interpretation
available to the courts. This is so not only for those jurisdictions which have
not as yet adopted a discovery rule, but also for those which have adopted a
discovery rule, because in most instances questions of interpretation still re-
main open, or subject to change.
An unusual and creative formulation of the discovery rule is found in
Dolce v. Gamberdino,15 where the Illinois court, while recognizing the
discovery rule, states that there are circumstances under which it would not be
applied. Dolce states that it "would apply the discovery rule only when
discovery occurs after the traditional limitation period"2 '6 has expired, "or
when discovery occurs at a time so near the running that the action has been,
for most purposes, barred"2 7 (emphasis added).
Dolce illustrates how courts in this area, in attempting to be creative, can
be ineffectual. Uncertainty must, to some extent, result from the Dolce formu-
lation of the discovery rule. It appears that a finding of fact would be required
in each case to determine whether or not discovery occurred "at a time so near
the running" of the traditional limitation period that "the action has been, for
most purposes, barred." What, one may ask, is meant by "so near" and "for
most purposes"? Vagueness alone makes this formulation unfair to the plain-
tiff. Furthermore, a plaintiff who is not given the benefit of the discovery rule
under Dolce, may have substantially less time within which to bring an action
than a plaintiff who, discovering the facts just a short time later (but still before
the running of the traditional limitation period), is placed within the umbrella
of the rule. The court reasons that "to permit the action when the plaintiff had
the time in which to file before the statute of limitations ran, would frustrate
the purposes of the statute of limitations and relieve little or no injustice."218
But what is time enough to file? And what is "little" injustice?
Where the discovery rule is applied in a traditional form, there are various
260 III. App. 3d 124, 376 N.E.2d 273 (1978).
2161d. at 129, 376 N.E. 2d at 277.
2
7Id.
"'Id. at 128, 376 N.E. 2d at 276.
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jurisdictional criteria for what, other than actual knowledge, will be adequate
to start the running of the statute of limitations. These include the time when
the client "should know;" '219 "should discover;"220 "should reasonably
discover;"22' "should have discovered;" '222 "by the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known;" '223 or facts which the client "by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have been discovered.""22 It is difficult at this time
to determine whether differences in the choice of words as between "know"
and "discover" may lead to a difference in result in particular cases. It might be
argued that where the word "discover" is used, this connotes that the client is
expected to have a somewhat more inquiring attitude as to what is transpiring
in the course of the attorney-client relationship, than is expected when the
word "know" is used.
There is, however, evidence in the cases which does not support this con-
clusion. Thus, the court in Neel, in what it describes as its holding, uses the
language "should know," '225 and yet, at another point in the same opinion,
which the court also describes as its holding, Neel uses the language "should
discover." '226 Furthermore, in Budd v. Nixen,227 a companion case to Neel, the
court describes the Neel criteria as "should reasonably discover,""22 and Budd
holds the criteria to be "should discover." '229 Certainly in this and other jurisdic-
tions where the words are used interchangeably, even within a single case,
there is no basis for concluding that differences between phrases such as
"should know" or "should discover" have any substantive import. It is also dif-
ficult to find evidence in other jurisdictions that these differences in language
carry with them substantive differences.
The following are important inquiries in this area:
First.- What is it that the plaintiff should have known or should have
discovered?
Second: What must be established in order to satisfy the requirement that
plaintiff should have known, or should have discovered?
Third.- Are the criteria adequate or proper?
2 
'Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 190, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846, 491 P.2d
421, 430 (1971) (en banc).
"'Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 203, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 854, 491 P.2d 433, 438 (1971) (en banc).
1111d. at 197, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 850, 491 P.2d at 434.
"'Kohler v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 111. App. 3d 455, 460, 304 N.E.2d 677, 681 (App. Ct. 1973).
"'Edwards v. Ford, 279 So. 2d 851, 853 (Fla. 1973).
1
4Family Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 157 W. Va. 983, 993-94, 207 S.E. 2d 157, 163 (1974).
"'6 Cal. 3d 176, 190, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846, 491 P.2d 421, 430 (1971) (en banc).
111d. at 194, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 849, 491 P.2d at 433.
12'6 Cal. 3d 195, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433 (1971) (en banc).
mId. at 197, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 850, 491 P.2d at 434.
1'Id. at 203, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 854, 491 P.2d at 438.
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Fourth: If not, what are adequate or proper criteria, and how should it be re-
quired that the ultimate facts be proven?
The first question, what is it that the plaintiff should have known or
discovered, is related to whether the discovery rule is applied in conjunction
with, or superimposed upon, what otherwise would have been the occurrence
rule or the damage rule. If the former, then from the time plaintiff should have
known of the wrongful act or omission, the statute is no longer tolled. If the
latter, the statute is no longer tolled from the time plaintiff should have known
sufficient facts to establish the cause of action, including damage."' In this
regard, it has been said that it is enough to show that plaintiff should have
known facts meeting these requirements and it is not necessary to show that
plaintiff knew the legal significance of these facts, as for example, that they
establish a cause of action in malpractice against the attorney."'
In answering the second question, what must be established to satisfy the
requirement that plaintiff "should have known" or "should have discovered,"
additional questions present themselves. Must it be established that the plain-
tiff, by the use of reasonable care or reasonable diligence, should have known
or discovered the relevant facts? If so, is the inquiry whether a reasonable per-
son should have known or discovered the facts, or whether this plaintiff, taking
into consideration the plaintiffs personal characteristics, would have
reasonably been expected to know or discover the facts?
Cases indicate that it is determinitive whether "with reasonable care
plaintiff could have discovered" ' the relevant facts; or whether plaintiff
"reasonably should have known" '233 of the alleged cause of action. While such
cases make the point that reasonableness is the determinant of what should
2
"°See section IX (3) for a discussion of the relationship of the discovery rule to the damage rule and the oc-
currence rule.
On the relationship of the discovery rule to the occurrence rule, see Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 201, 98
Cal. Rptr. 849, 852, 491 P.2d 433, 436 (1971) (en banc), where the court observes that since the cause of ac-
tion for breach of a professional service contract arose on the date of the breach, and no consequential or ac-
tual damage need be suffered to give the client a right to bring the action in contract, "the statutory period
commences when the client knows, or reasonably should know of the breach."
On the relationship of the discovery rule to the damage rule, see: Thorpe v. DeMent, 69 N.C. App. 355,
362, 317 S.E.2d 692, 697 (Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 322 S.E.2d 777 ("In other words, plaintiffs had constructive
knowledge of all the essential elements of a complete malpractice cause of action.); Greater Area Inc. v.
Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 829 (1982) ("... the statute of limitations for legal malpractice does not begin to
run until the client discovers, or reasonably should discover, the existence of all the elements of his cause of
action.")
"
3 ln McGee v. Weinberg, 159 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89, 97 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803 (1979), the court states: "The
statute of limitations is not tolled by belated discovery of legal theories, as distinguished from belated
discovery of facts ... However, the Supreme Court repeatedly has explained that it is the knowledge of facts
rather than discovery of legal theory, that is the test." In Graham v. Harlin, Parker & Rudloff, 664 S.W.2d
945, 947 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), the opinion reads: "The knowledge that one has been wronged and by whom
starts the running of the statute of limitations for professional malpractice not the knowledge that the wrong
is actionable."
'
3Melgard v. Hanna, 45 Or. App. 133, 137, 607 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1980).
"'Greater Area Inc. v. Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 830 (1982).
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have been known or discovered, they do not discuss or articulate whether this
is to be the reasonableness of the objective reasonable person, or
reasonableness when taking into consideration the plaintiffs characteristics.
However, where the articulated test is whether the facts were "sufficient to put
a reasonable person on inquiry,"' this should point towards the objective
reasonable person test. Furthermore, in construing the language of the cases, it
would appear that presumptively the objective reasonable person test is in-
dicated, absent relevant qualifying language. This is the traditional negligence
test, and there is generally no basis for concluding, without some indication to
the contrary in a particular case, that the court means otherwise.
Responding to the third question that has been posed, are the criteria ade-
quate or proper? If it is the objective reasonable person test that is applied, the
criteria are neither adequate nor proper. The objective reasonable person test
developed in a wholly different context. It was deemed that, in a traditional
negligence action, an adult defendant should not escape liability for harm in-
flicted upon an innocent plaintiff on the ground that the defendant was of low
intelligence. 35 Although, even here, debilitating physical characteristics are
considered. 36 This has no relevance to a legal malpractice action where there is
a fiduciary attorney-client relationship, pursuant to which the attorney has
wronged the client, and the question of reasonableness goes to whether the cli-
ent should have known or discovered the wrong and should be barred from
recovery.
With respect to the fourth question, there appears to be no sound basis for
adopting a rule that does not consider the client's intelligence, education, expe-
rience, and other relevant circumstances, in determining whether the client
reasonably should have known or discovered certain facts.23 The relevant con-
siderations are these: The attorney accepted this client in afiduciary relation-
ship. 238 This is a relationship in which, under our system of jurisprudence, the
23 McCann v. Welden, 200 Cal. Rptr. 703, 707, 153 Cal. App. 3d 814, 822, (1984). The court points out that
this can determine whether the test set out in California Code, Civil Procedure, § 340.6 is met, i.e., that a
person "through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered . . . the facts constituting the
wrongful act or omission .... "
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965). Section 283 provides: "Unless the actor is a child, the stan-
dard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances."
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965). Section 283 C provides: "If the actor is ill or otherwise
physically disabled, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a
reasonable man under like disability."
"'Factors of this nature are already considered in a traditional negligence action where a child is involved.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965), provides: "If the actor is a child, the standard of conduct
to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence,
and experience under like circumstances."
"'California cases refer to a "professional relationship." In Call v. Kezirian, 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 196, 185
Cal. Rptr. 103, 107 (1982), a medical malpractice action, the court states that "where there is a professional
relationship, the degree of diligence in ferreting out the negligence for the purpose of the statute of limita-
tions is diminished." In Baright v. Willis, 151 Cal. App. 3d 303, 311, 198 Cal. Rptr. 510, 514 (1984), a legal
malpractice action, the court quotes this language from Call. But there is no indication as to the manner in
which the required degree of diligence would be "diminished."
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client generally must retain some attorney. It would be lacking in fundamental
fairness to permit the attorney to escape liability for a wrong committed
against this client because of this client's minimal intelligence, education, expe-
rience, or other relevant circumstances. Where this is permitted, it savors of
entrapment.
Furthermore, when litigating the question of whether a client reasonably
should have known certain facts, the burden of proof should be on the at-
torney to prove that the client reasonably should have known these facts, with
the requirement that this be established by clear and convincing evidence,
rather than by a preponderance of the evidence. This would be fair and ap-
propriate, considering the nature of the attorney-client relationship.
Assuming it is found in a particular case that the client reasonably should
have known the relevant facts, even after considering the client's intelligence,
education, experience, and other relevant circumstances, should this be a bar
to the client's recovery? It would appear that at this point, where a jurisdiction
has adopted a comparative negligence principle, whether by statute or com-
mon law, this finding should, at most, be considered in reduction of damages.239
Even where a comparative negligence principle has not been adopted, courts
are frequently in a position to adopt such a principle, and to do so would be
both appropriate and necessary, in order to achieve fundamental fairness in
these circumstances.
X. CONTINUOUS REPRESENTATION AND COMPARABLE RULES
A. Development and Rationale of Continuous Representation Rule
The continuous representation rule, or doctrine, with some modifications
and differences which will presently be discussed, provides for tolling the
statute of limitations on malpractice committed by an attorney in relation to a
particular case or matter, as long as the attorney continues to represent the
client in that case or matter. The principle source of the doctrine is New York,
where it was developed by analogy with the continuous treatment doctrine, a
judicially created doctrine in medical malpractice. In the leading case of Siegel
v. Kranis,", the court points out that in medical malpractice cases New York
had once followed the rule that the statute of limitations begins running from
the incidence of the wrongful conduct. But, the court observed, this was no
longer the rule in all medical malpractice cases, as it has been held "that at least
"'While some comparative negligence statutes allow recovery even if plaintiff's contributory negligence is
more than fifty per cent, in Wisconsin, pursuant to § 895.045, if the negligence of the person seeking
recovery is greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, contributory
negligence will bar recovery; otherwise, the contributory negligence of the person seeking recovery will not
bar recovery, but only result in diminishing the amount of recovery.
A caveat to be observed in attempting to apply a comparative negligence statute in a legal malpractice ac-
tion for the purpose suggested in the text, is that the language of a statute may not be applicable to this kind
of situation.
2'29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1968).
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when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions
has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or com-
plaint, the 'accrual' comes only at the end of the treatment."2' The Siegelcourt
concludes that this rule is "equally applicable to the conduct of litigation by at-
torneys."2 ' It should be observed at the outset, that some fourteen years after
Siegel, in 1982, the New York Court of Appeals, considering the continuous
treatment rule and the continuous representation rule in two cases decided
within approximately a two-week period, concluded that the statute of limita-
tions is tolled while the treatment or representation continues,243 rather than
finding, as in Siegel and other cases,4 that the cause of action does not accrue
until termination of the treatment or representation.
In support of the proposition that attorneys should be governed by a rule
comparable to physicians, the following reasons have been advanced." 5 First,
there is more than a superficial resemblance between the continuous treatment
of a condition of a patient and the continuous representation of a client by an
attorney, as in both instances the relationship between the parties is marked by
trust and confidence. Second, in both relationships the recipient of the service
is necessarily at a disadvantage to question the reason for the tactics employed
or the manner in which the tactics are executed. Third, a patient would not be
expected to interrupt the course of treatment by suing a delinquent physician,
and a client would not be expected to interrupt the service of an attorney by
suing the attorney. And finally, the client is not in a position to know the in-
tricacies of practice and whether necessary steps in an action have been taken.
Prior to 1975, developments in the continuous treatment and the con-
tinuous representation rules in New York found their origins in judicial deci-
sions. In 1975, New York amended its statutory requirements with respect to
the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions, and codified for the
first time the continuous treatment doctrine, using this language: "An action
for medical or dental malpractice must be commenced within two years and six
months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last treatment where
there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which
gave rise to the said act, omission or failure ...."I'
However, the continuous representation doctrine was not then, or
thereafter, codified in New York. Nevertheless, in 1982, an intermediate ap-
211d. at 479-80, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (quoting Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 155. 237
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321, 187 N.E. 2d 777, 778 (1962)).
'14 1d. at 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
1'Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674, 439 N.E.2d 390 (1982) (legal malpractice); McDermott
v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351, 437 N.E.2d 1108 (1982) (medical malpractice).
'"See, e.g., Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46, 436 N.E.2d 496 (1982).
2
'These reasons are advanced by the court in Siegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (App. Div.
1968).
"N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-a (McKinney 1975).
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pellate court, taking cognizance of the codification of the continuous treat-
ment doctrine, but not the continuous representation doctrine, wrote: "The
1975 enactment of the CPLR 214-a, recognizing the continuous treatment
theory of medical malpractice, does not preclude its extension into other pro-
fessions, "247 citing an opinion of the New York Court of Appeals248 which
stated that with respect to other types of professional dereliction [other than
medical dereliction] judicial authority has been left intact. About two weeks
later, a decision of the New York Court of Appeals2 9 expressly reaffirmed ac-
ceptance of the continuous representation doctrine in legal malpractice, mak-
ing no reference to the failure of the legislature to codify the continuous
representation doctrine when, some seven years earlier, it codified the con-
tinuous treatment doctrine.
B. Characteristics of Continuous Representation Rule and Comparable Rules
As has been indicated, the New York cases in which the continuous
representation rule was developed, initially stated that a legal malpractice ac-
tion did not accrue until the attorney's representation of the client with respect
to the particular case or matter terminated, but the New York Court of Ap-
peals25° has now determined that the doctrine tolls the statute of limitations
rather than delaying the accrual of the cause of action. As a result, a client
should be permitted to commence a legal malpractice action against an at-
torney, should the client choose to do so, before termination of the attorney's
representation in the particular case or matter,251 whereas if accrual were
delayed, the client would be required to await termination of the representa-
tion before commencing an action.
In the process of setting out the parameters of the continuous representa-
tion rule, the New York Court of Appeals stated that "its application is limited
to situations in which the attorney who allegedly was responsible for the
malpractice continues to represent the client in that case. When that relation-
ship ends, for whatever reason, the purpose for applying the continuous
representation rule no longer exists." '252 But earlier lower and intermediate ap-
pellate court opinions contain concepts that are not included in this formula-
2
'Boorman v. Bleakley, Platt, Schmidt, Hart and Fritz, 88 A.D.2d 942, 943, 451 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (App.
Div. 1982).
2
'Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46, 436 N.E.2d 496 (1982).
249Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674, 439 N.E.2d 390 (1982).
2
° Id.
25 See McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 407, 452 N.Y.S.2d 351, 355, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1111-1112
(1982), a medical malpractice action, where the court states:
Rather than define the action's accrual in terms of the [continuous treatment] doctrine, it is defined in
terms of when the original negligent act occurred. Continuous treatment serves simply as a toll - the
action may be brought at any time, but the patient will not be compelled to initiate judicial pro-
ceedings so long as the physician continues to treat the injury (see Borgia v. City of New York, supra).
"12Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 94, 453 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678, 439 N.E.2d 390, 393 (1982).
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tion of the continuous representation rule, but at the same time may be con-
sidered as being basically compatible with it. These concepts are therefore
worthy of examination as, in an appropriate case, they may be "incorporated"
into an emergent formulation of the continuous representation rule.
In Muller v. Sturnam,2 3 decided by an intermediate appellate court in
1981, the plaintiff alleged, in an action commenced on April 20, 1978, that she
retained attorney-defendants in 1971 to handle certain matters involving her
former husband, which included collection of the principal and interest on a
promissory note dated May 24, 1967, and that defendants failed to effect prop-
er and timely service of process in a lawsuit to enforce payment of the prom-
issory note. In finding the continuous representation rule inapplicable under
the facts of the case, the court stated that "it is apparent that the application of
the continuous representation doctrine in attorney malpractice envisions a
relationship between the parties that is marked with trust and confidence.
' 254
Furthermore, "[ilt is a relationship which is not sporadic but developing and in-
volves a continuity of the professional services from which the alleged
malpractice stems." '255
If these concepts are to be accepted, questions of fact will, of course, arise
as to what involves a "sporadic" relationship, as distinguished from one involv-
ing a "continuity of the professional services." More striking is the court's
statement that application of the continuous representation doctrine envisions
a relationship "marked with trust and confidence." Should it be appropriate to
look behind each attorney-client relationship to determine whether it meets
these criteria, or should the attorney-client relationship be deemed, as a
fiduciary relationship, to be one involving trust and confidence? Perhaps this
question answers itself.
A 1976 trial court opinion, Dura-Bilt Remodelers, Inc. v. Albanese,256
deals with a factual situation dissimilar to that treated in numerous other cases
applying the continuous representation rule. In Dura-Bilt, the attorney had an
ongoing relationship with the client "and presumably represented the client
with respect to a number of different matters."2 7 The court concluded that "in
such a case, it would be unfair to apply a simplistic rule that a cause of action
with respect to any one of a multitude of transactions handled by the attorney
did not accrue until the overall attorney-client relationship was terminated.""25
However, "there is no indication that the plaintiff should have concluded that
the particular case in question had been concluded prior to the time when the
25379 A.D.2d 482, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205 (App. Div. 1981).
2 4 Id. at 485-86, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
111Id. at 486, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
2586 Misc. 2d 172, 382 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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overall attorney-client relationship terminated in December, 1973."259
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs cause of action "should be deemed
to have accrued no earlier than December, 1973, ''26 and accordingly the action
was timely commenced.
It appears, under Dura-Bilt, that in each legal malpractice action where
there is an ongoing relationship in which the attorney represents the client in
more than one matter, a factual determination would be required as to
whether the client should have concluded that the particular matter had been
terminated prior to termination of the overall attorney-client relationship. If
the client should have so concluded, presumably the statute of limitations will
cease to be tolled (or, in the alternative, the cause of action will accrue) prior to
the termination of the overall attorney-client relationship. If the client should
not have so concluded, presumably the statute will continue to be tolled (or, in
the alternative, the cause of action will not accrue) until the overall attorney
attorney-client relationship has terminated.
The Dura-Bilt formulation appears to be consistent with the reasoning, if
not with all of the language, of cases that do not articulate it. Cases which
describe the continuous representation rule as causing the statute of limita-
tions to be tolled (or preventing the action from accruing), only as long as the
attorney is handling the matter in which the malpractice occurred, are general-
ly cases where factually the attorney has handled only one matter for the
client. The rule stated in these cases is therefore as broad as is required under
the facts.
Additionally, the justification for the continuous representation rule,
when stated in terms of the general formulation, logically requires a progres-
sion to the Dura-Bilt formulation, when warranted by the facts. A principal
justification given for the general formulation is that the relationship between
attorney and client "is marked with trust and confidence." 6' If this is sufficient
reason for tolling the statute of limitations (or preventing the action from ac-
cruing), until the particular matter in which the malpractice occurs is terminat-
ed, certainly where the attorney continues to handle other unrelated matters,
this continuing attorney-client relationship, marked with trust and confidence,
should be sufficient reason to toll the statute (or prevent the action from accru-
ing), until the overall attorney-client relationship is terminated, if the client
should not have concluded that the particular matter was earlier terminated.
It is suggested that Dura-Bilt does not go far enough, although it was not
required, under the facts of that case, to extend its holding further. Even in a
situation where an attorney is handling only one matter for a client, and this
matter is terminated, a preferable rule would be that the statute continue to be
"
9 d. at 175, 382 N.Y.S. 2d at 457.
' iegel v. Kranis, 29 A.D.2d 477, 480, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (App. Div. 1968).
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tolled (or in the alternative, the action not accrue) until the client knows or
should know that the matter is terminated. It is further suggested that, in view
of the relationship between attorney and client, it be required that this must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a preponderance
of the evidence. This would provide additional merited protection for the
client, without unfairness towards the attorney.
In Michigan, in developing rules relative to statutes of limitations in
malpractice actions, there was interaction, and some divergence and possible
tension, between the courts and the legislature. The 1932 case of De Haan v.
Winter,21 2 and its interpretation, was pivotal in this regard. This was a medical
malpractice action in which improper treatment of a fractured bone was al-
leged. The court states: "When did plaintiffs cause of action accrue? Until
treatment of the fracture ceased the relation of patient and physician con-
tinued, and the statute of limitations did not run .... -263
At the time of the De Haan decision, the Michigan statute did not contain
a "continuous treatment" provision. But about thirty years later, section
600.5838 of the Michigan statutes was adopted, which provided: "A claim based
on malpractice of a person who is, or holds himself out to be, a member of a
state licensed profession accrues at the time that person discontinues treating
or otherwise serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudo-professional
capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose. 2 64
Thus, a continuous treatment (or continuous representation) rule was in-
corporated into statute. About a decade later, the Michigan Supreme Court, in
Dyke v. Richard,265 confronted the question of whether a two-year discovery
rule that the Michigan courts had adopted was in conflict with this statutory
provision, and the court held that it was not. The court reasoned that the
statutory provision incorporating the last treatment doctrine "comports with
the legislative comment accompanying it, viz: 'Section 5838 is based on the
rule stated and followed in the Michigan case of De Haan v. Winter."'I" The
court then concludes that "the legislature merely intended to codify the De
Haan decision and no more intended to obviate the question of discovery than
the De Haan court did.1267
A question of due process is also raised and considered by the court in
Dyke. It reasons that a statute which expressly extinguishes a common law
right may be regarded as a proper exercise of legislative authority, citing ex-
amples of abolition of the common law causes of action for alientation of affec-
12258 Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932).
2 6 3Id. at 296, 241 N.W. at 924.
2
"MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5838 (West 1968).
265390 Mich. 739, 213 N.W.2d 185 (1973).
2
"Id. at 744, 213 N.W.2d at 187.
2
"ld. at 747, 213 N.W.2d at 188.
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tions, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry. But,
the court reasons, the statute under consideration is not intended to extinguish
a common law right. It is rather intended as a statute of limitations, a charge
on a person who would assert a claim, as "lilt requires action on his part within
a legislatively specified time, or obliges him to forego it altogether."2 Relying
on Price v. Hopkins, 9 the Dyke court concludes that as to a person who
neither knows nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could ascertain
within a two-year period that he has a cause of action, the statute would have
"the effect of abolishing his right to bring suit"27 if it excluded the possibility of
a discovery rule. Since the legislature did not intend to abolish a right of action,
this statute, the court concludes, would be unconstitutional as violative of due
process if it precluded the possibility of a discovery rule. The court accordingly
concluded that the two-year discovery rule, previously adopted by the courts,
remains a part of the common law of Michigan.
If this argument were urged upon and accepted by courts in other jurisdic-
tions, statutes of limitations for legal malpractice could be found unconstitu-
tional as violative of due process if they did not contain a discovery rule and
precluded the courts from adopting a discovery rule. Furthermore, if a statute
neither included nor prohibited a discovery rule, it seems that the courts would
be required to adopt such a rule in order to preserve the constitutionality of the
statutory scheme.
Under an extrapolation of the Dyke reasoning, it appears that application
of the Wilcox doctrine, adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 1830,
and discussed in sections IV and V, supra, which adheres to the occurrence
rule, would be unconstitutional if a discovery rule were not also provided for in
a jurisdiction. Similarly, acceptance of the damage rule in a jurisdiction,
without a discovery rule, would, under an extrapolation of the Dyke reason-
ing, appear to be violative of due process. Suffice it to say, acceptance of this
reasoning would make monumental inroads in the area of legal malpractice.
The Michigan legislature, about eighteen months after Dyke, incor-
porated a discovery rule into statute, but it was a six month, and not a two
year, discovery rule. The statute27' provides that a claim based on malpractice
accrues at the time the person "discontinues treating or otherwise serving
plaintiff' 272 in a professional or pseudoprofessional capacity "as to the matters
out of which the malpractice arose;" '273 and further provides that an action in-
volving a claim based on malpractice may be commenced at any time within
I
6 d. at 746, 213 N.W.2d at 187.
26913 Mich. 318 (1865).
27 Dyke v. Richard, 390 Mich. 739, 746-47, 213 N.W.2d 185, 188 (1973).
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the applicable period (which is two years),27 "or within six months after plain-
tiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is
later."27' Thus, the statute of limitations will commence running upon the ter-
mination of treatment (or the termination of representation) but the limitation
period will in no event expire prior to six months after the aggrieved party
discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim.
The Michigan concept is a good one because the period of limitation can-
not expire until the matter out of which the malpractice arose has been ter-
minated for the statutory period of two years and the client has either
discovered or should have discovered the existence of the claim for six months.
But the Michigan statutory scheme has shortcomings. In applying the terms of
the statute, the period of limitation could, absent some special interpretation
by the court, expire before the client knows or should know that the matter out
of which the malpractice arose is terminated, and thus while the client may be
in a continuing position of dependence or reliance upon the attorney, even
though the client has discovered or should have discovered the existence of the
claim for six months. Furthermore, the six months provided for in the
discovery rule is too short a period.
Consider the fact that generally the shortest statutory period is one year,
as in defamation, assault and battery. 76 It was desirous for reasons of public
policy that these acions be brought quickly. Yet one year was apparently
deemed to be the shortest reasonable time. While these actions are not tradi-
tionally governed by a discovery rule, in almost all instances there is no need
for a discovery rule with respect to these actions. If one year is deemed to be
the shortest reasonable period for a traditional statute of limitations, why
should a discovery rule, which may provide the only period within which a per-
son can, in reality, maintain an action, encompass a lesser period? It may be
urged that statutes of limitations are statutes of repose, and therefore it is
desirable that the discovery period be a short one in order to achieve the
benefits of "repose." But a discovery rule always cuts sharply against the con-
cept of repose by extending the time within which an action can be main-
tained. If it is sound policy to do this, it is certainly unsound policy to make the
discovery period unreasonably short in terms of achieving its objective.
In the application of the Michigan statute, in determining when represen-
tation terminates, the courts have dealt with factually interesting cases, and
have developed interesting concepts. In Berry v. Zismam,2"1 the Michigan
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a legal malpractice ac-
tion pursuant to Michigan statute. The malpractice action was commenced
... MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805 (West Supp. 1986).
... MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5838 (West Supp. 1986).
"'See R. PHELPS, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES 102 (1978).
27170 Mich. App. 376, 245 N.W.2d 758 (1976).
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against the attorney on October 2, 1974. The client had previously, on March
1, 1971, commenced a malpractice action against the attorney for the same
alleged wrong. However, on motion of the attorney, this earlier malpractice ac-
tion had been dismissed. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that in-
stitution of the earlier malpractice action on March 1, 1971, was "equivalent
to the discharge of defendant as plaintiffs' attorney" '278 and therefore the two
year statute of limitations had run prior to the institution, on October 2, 1974,
of the second malpractice action.
The court relied in its reasoning on Genrow v. Flynn,279 where the
Michigan Supreme Court found that where a client "seeks to degrade and
humiliate"28 0 attorneys by sending them a telegram in which the client states
that the attorneys have been "guilty of falsehood and gross fraud and neglect,
and that he does not intend to stand their abuse any longer,"2 ' this is
equivalent to a discharge of the attorneys. In Berry, the court stated that it
could conceive of very little that was more "humiliating or degrading" '282 to an
attorney than having his client sue him for malpractice.
While it appears that in the usual case it may be concluded, as in Berry,
that suing an attorney for malpractice may be treated as discontinuing the at-
torney's services, an inquiry should nevertheless be made in each case to deter-
mine whether, based on the totality of facts, this is a warranted conclusion.
Furthermore, it certainly seems inappropriate to reason that "humiliation" of
an attorney is equivalent to discontinuing the attorney's services, with the
result that the statute of limitations is triggered by such "humiliation." In
Genrow, the client's telegram, as indicated, included the statement to the ef-
fect that he "does not intend to stand their [the attorneys'] abuse any longer. ' 283
It would appear that this statement, rather than the concept of "humiliation,"
would form a more reasonable basis for concluding that the attorneys' services
were discontinued. However, even this statement, without additional facts,
does not import termination of services.
Developments in Ohio demonstrate a willingness of the courts to abruptly
change course when considering statutes of limitations in malpractice actions.
These developments appear to have been marked with less divergence between
the courts and legislature than was the case in Michigan. In 1941, in Galloway
v. Hood,"28 a legal malpractice action, the Court of Appeals refused to accept
plaintiffs contention that his cause of action "did not 'accrue' until the rela-
"'Id. at 380, 245 N.W.2d at 760.
" 166 Mich. 564, 131 N.W. 1115 (1911).
2Imd. at 568, 131 N.W. at 1116.
2811d.
n170 Mich. App. 376, 380, 245 N.w.2d 758, 760 (1976).
2'3166 Mich. 564, 568, 131 N.W. 1115, 1116 (1911).
2 969 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941).
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tionship between himself, as client, and the defendants, as his attorneys, had
terminated." '285 The court adopted this position although, in the language of the
court, "it [the rule for which plaintiff contended] is generally the rule applied in
cases arising between patient and physician or surgeon." '286 The court's position
was that, in the absence of fraud or concealment on the part of the attorney,
the action for legal malpractice accrues when the acts constituting malpractice
occur.
Subsequently, in Wyler v. Tripi,281 a medical malpractice action, the
Supreme Court of Ohio observed that it had "adopted the continuing
negligence theory by stating that in all medical malpractice cases, the latest
time at which the statute of limitations commences running is the time at
which the physician-patient relationship finally terminates." '8 The court's
reference to the latest time, however, raised the question of when and under
what circumstances the statute would commence running at the time of ter-
mination of the physician-patient relationship, and whether, and under what
circumstances, it would commence running at an earlier time. The Wyler case
took on considerable significance in legal malpractice in Ohio, as the Supreme
Court of Ohio, in Keaton Co. v. Kolby,28 9 adopted the Wyler rule in legal
malpractice. Keaton concluded, contrary to Galloway, that there was no
logical basis for treating doctors and attorneys differently, and accordingly
held that "a cause of action for malpractice against an attorney accrues, at the
latest, when the attorney-client relationship finally terminates." 2
But the Supreme Court of Ohio sharply changed direction in 1983 in
Oliver v. Kaiser Community Health Foundation,2 9' a medical malpractice ac-
tion. Here, the court adopted a discovery rule, holding that "a cause of action
for medical malpractice accrues and the statute of limitations commences to
run when the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence should have discovered, the resulting injury." '92 The court's reason-
ing is, in part, defensive, but at the same time articulate. In Wyler, some twelve
years earlier, in refusing to adopt the discovery rule, the court had stated that it
was "convinced that to do so would place us in the obvious and untenable posi-
tion of having not only legislated, but of having done so directly in the face of a
clear and opposite legislative intent." '93 But in Oliver, the court observes that
the majority in Wyler placed undue emphasis upon the fact that the legislature
"'Id. at 280, 43 N.E.2d at 632.
2 61d.
w25 Ohio St. 2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971).
mId. at 167, 267 N.E.2d at 421.
227 Ohio St. 2d 234, 271 N.E.2d 772 (1971), overruled, 5 Ohio St. 3rd 210, 450 N.E.2d 684 (1983).
mId. at 238, 271 N.E.2d at 774.
295 Ohio St. 3d I I1, 449 N.E.2d 438 (1983).
21d. at 117-118, 449 N.E.2d at 443-44.
21125 Ohio St. 2d 164, 171, 267 N.E.2d 419, 423.
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had declined to pass a bill that was introduced to add a discovery rule to the
medical malpractice statute of limitations. The Oliver court reasons that there
are many possible reasons, extant its view of the merits of a particular rule,
why a legislature may fail to adopt a rule, and accordingly, it is erroneous to
conclude that failure of the legislature to adopt the discovery rule
demonstrated an intent to reject it.
The court concludes that it has the power to adopt a discovery rule and in-
dicates what appears to be its fundamental reason for doing so when it states
that the discovery rule "will ameliorate the obvious and flagrant injustice fre-
quently resulting from the operation of the termination rule."' 9 Indeed the
court in Wyler, when it adopted the termination rule, reluctantly observed that
"there is much to recommend the adoption of the discovery rule;" '95 and the
dissenting opinion in Wyler observed that the termination rule "affords no
relief to a patient whose injury is such that it is not discoverable until a time
well beyond termination of treatment."
296
In Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman,297 decided just three weeks after Oliver,
the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled Keaton, and adopted the discovery rule
in legal malpractice, observing that in Oliver it had articulated policy con-
siderations for adopting the discovery rule in medical malpractice actions, and
"the policy considerations underlying the 'discovery rule' are no less compel-
ling in legal malpractice actions. '298
The central basis for the Supreme Court of Ohio overruling cases in which
it had applied the termination rule appears to be the fact that the termination
rule does not meet the needs served by the discovery rule. The court obviously
chose not to apply a concept such as that applied in Michigan, which would
result in having both rules. However, since the opinions of the Supreme Court
of Ohio in Wyler and Keaton indicate that it finds no barrier to adopting the
termination rule, and its opinions in Oliver and Skidmore indicate that it finds
no barrier to adopting the discovery rule, in both medical and legal malprac-
tice, perhaps the Ohio court will reconsider and re-institute the termination
rule, to be applied in conjunction with the discovery rule.
The benefit that would be achieved by such a development is indicated in
the foregoing analysis of the statute of limitations in Michigan. 9 9 The inade-
quacies of the Michigan statutory scheme, also analyzed at that point, could be
95 Ohio St. 3d 111, 117, 449 N.E. 2d 438, 443.
9525 Ohio St. 2d 164, 171, 267 N.E.2d 419, 423.
tm ld. at 176, 267 N.E.2d at 426.
1175 Ohio St. 3d 210, 450 N.E.2d 684 (1983).
29 Id. at 211, 450 N.E.2d at 685.
'"See discussion in section X, supra.
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avoided.3w If such a step were to be taken, it is suggested that consideration of
the proposals set out in section XI, that follows, would also be relevant.
XI. PROPOSED RULES AND PRINCIPLES FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
Proposals for a comprehensive and integrated series of rules and prin-
ciples, which are recommended with respect to statutes of limitations in legal
malpractice actions, are set out in this section. In formulating these proposals
or recommendations, consideration has been given to the fiduciary relation-
ship between attorney and client, the strong element of dependence by the
client upon the attorney, the realities of life experience in dealing with legal
matters, that are frequently emotionally trying and vary from the relatively
simple to the incredibly complex, the needs and perceptions of the client and
society at large, and the legitimate expectations of attorneys and the system of
justice. By maximally taking into account these considerations, the expecta-
tion is that the proposals will meet the test of fundamental fairness. Material
supportive and otherwise relevant to these proposals is found in the relevant
sections of this article.
It is proposed or recommended that the following be adopted or included
in rules and principles relating to statutes of limitations in legal malpractice ac-
tions:
1. Where the action is in tort for negligence, the period of limitation is to
be that provided in the applicable tort statute of limitations, which would
preferably be three years, but not less than two years. Where the action, under
relevant jurisdictional criteria, is treated as one in contract, the contract
statute of limitations is to apply. Where the action is grounded in negligence,
but may be treated as an action in contract under relevant jurisdictional
criteria, the plaintiff is to have an election of remedies and may proceed in
either tort or contract.
Where there is a malpractice statute of limitations that is deemed to apply
to legal malpractice actions, the period of limitation would preferably be three
years, but not less than two years. Upon the election of plaintiff, the action is
to be treated as one in contract, if relevant jurisdictional criteria are met, and
in this event the contract statute of limitations shall apply.
2. The damage rule, with a discovery rule superimposed or added, shall
be adopted, together with a continuous representation rule. The details and
characteristics of the damage rule, discovery rule and continuous representa-
tion rule, are set out in the subsequent proposals.
3. The damage rule is to provide that a cause of action for legal malprac-
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4. The damage rule is to apply whether the alleged wrong of the attorney
is characterized by the court to be an action in tort or contract.
5. Substantial damage must occur before the element of damage, required
by the damage rule, is deemed to be met.
6. Attorneys' fees, paid or accrued, and legal costs and expenditures, paid
or accrued, including but not limited to court costs, shall not be considered
damage for the purpose of the damage rule or the accrual of a cause of action
for legal malpractice.
7. A discovery rule shall be adopted which is to provide that the statute of
limitations is tolled until the client knows or should know facts that establish
all of the elements of the cause of action that are required under the damage
rule.
8. The statute of limitations shall be tolled until the attorney's representa-
tion of the client in the matter in which the alleged malpractice arose (referred
to below as the particular matter) is terminated. Furthermore, more than ter-
mination is required to start the statute of limitations running as is set out
below in proposals relevant to the continuous representation rule.
9. In determining whether the client "should know" facts, in applying the
discovery rule, the determinative question is whether this individual client
reasonably should have known the facts, taking into account the client's in-
telligence, education, experience, and other relevant characteristics. The objec-
tive reasonable person test is not to be applied.
10. The burden of proof is upon the attorney to establish that the client
knew or should have known facts necessary to establish a cause of action, so
that the requirements of the discovery rule are met.
11. The quantum of proof necessary to establish that the client knew or
should have known these facts is clear and convincing evidence.
12. Where it is found that the client reasonably should have known facts
necessary to establish a cause of action, the doctrine of comparative negligence
shall apply, so that if it is determined that the attorney was negligent, the
client's recovery shall be reduced, but not precluded.
13. A continuous representation rule shall be adopted which is to provide
that the statute of limitations shall be tolled until the attorney's representation
in the particular matter is terminated and the client knows or should know that
it is terminated.
14. In determining whether the client should know that the attorney's
representation in the particular matter is terminated, the determinative ques-
tion is whether this individual client reasonably should have known that the
representation terminated, taking into account the client's intelligence, educa-
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tion, experience, and other relevant characteristics. The objective reasonable
person test is not to be applied.
15. The burden of proof is upon the attorney to establish that the client
knew or should have known that the attorney's representation in the particular
matter terminated.
16. The quantum of proof necessary to establish that the client knew or
should have known that the attorney's representation in the particular matter
terminated is clear and convincing evidence.
17. The period of limitation shall in no event expire until the attorney's
representation in the particular matter has been terminated and the client
knows or reasonably should know that it has been terminated for at least one
year, and at the same time, during this entire period of at least one year, the
client knows or reasonably should know facts that establish all of the elements
of a cause of action under the damage rule.
These proposals anchor, or cement as a first step, the damage rule in tort
and contract. Without more, this would prevent the statute of limitations from
commencing to run, and the period of limitation from running, while a client is
in a position to maintain an action for only nominal damages.
This discovery rule, which is superimposed upon the damage rule, would
toll the statute of limitations until the client knows or should know facts that
would cause the statute to commence running under the damage rule, if there
were no discovery rule. Furthermore, in no event would the period of limita-
tion expire before at least one year has elapsed after the attorney's representa-
tion in the particular matter has terminated and the client knows or reasonably
should know that it has been terminated, and concurrently, during this entire
period of at least one year, the client knows or reasonably should know facts
that establish all of the elements of a cause of action under the damage rule.
This provides for fundamental fairness in the context of the attorney-client
relationship, as it establishes a standard pursuant to which the client would
generally be both knowledgeable and not under the influence of the attorney
for at least one year.
Various additional safeguards are provided, to maximize the probability
of justice in each case. Thus, where the critical issue is whether the client
should have known facts under the discovery rule, the proposals require that it
be shown that the client reasonably should have known the facts, taking into
consideration the client's personal characteristics, and not measuring against
the objective reasonable person. Since the attorney is a fiduciary with whom
the client places reliance and trust, it would be unfair to bar the client from re-
covery for a wrong committed by the attorney on the basis of what the objec-
tive reasonable person would be expected to know, rather than what this cli-
ent, as an individual, would be expected to know. The same requirement, for
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the same reasons, is applied where the question is whether the client should
have known that the attorney's representation had terminated in a particular
matter.
To ask a fiduciary, who wishes to bar a client from recovery for a wrong
committed by the fiduciary, to establish by clear and convincing evidence
(rather than by a preponderance of the evidence) that the client knew or should
have known facts, is simply taking into account the fiduciary relationship,
reasonable expectations, and a striving for fundamental fairness.
Where it is proposed that the continuous representation rule require more
than a showing that the representation by the attorney has terminated in the
particular matter, but in addition that the client knows or should know that
the representation has terminated, (using the individualized test for "should
know" and requiring clear and convincing evidence), nothing beyond fun-
damental fairness is sought, and hopefully no less is achieved.
These proposals do not place an undue burden upon attorneys. I would
simply ask that each proposal be examined in light of the material and analysis
contained in this article, and any other factors or considerations that may be
deemed relevant. The proposals present what is, under the circumstances of
the attorney-client relationship, and the realities of its functioning within our
society, a fair set of principles.3"' If these proposals are implemented, this will
not only prevent erosion of respect for the legal profession, but in my view,
significantly raise the respect for the profession in the eyes of individual clients,
and in the eyes of the community and society at large. Attorneys have been in
the forefront as leaders in society, and the surest way of preventing erosion, or
continued erosion, of respect for the legal profession, is to act fairly with
respect to persons who fall within the profession's care and trust.
1'See ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Profile of Legal Malpractice: A Statistical
Study of Determinative Characteristics of Claims Asserted Against Attorneys (1986). This study is based
upon an analysis of 29,227 claims asserted against attorneys reportedin the National Legal Malpractice
Data Center of the American Bar Association from January, 1983, through September 30, 1985, and reports
that 26% of the claims were based upon alleged administrative error. Of the claims involving personal injury
plaintiffs. 50.2% of the claims were based on alleged administrative error. These errors can most readily be
avoided. See also Mallen, Legal Malpractice: Controlling the Odds, TRIAL 24 (September 1984), which con-
tains earlier statistics from the American Bar Association's National Legal Malpractice Data Center, in-
dicating that with respect to claims involving personal injury plaintiffs, 48.9% of the claims were based
upon administrative error, which the author concludes are avoidable errors that relate more to the manner
in which attorneys conduct their business than to their legal skill or knowledge.
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